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Abstract
We examine a monopolistic supplier's decision about a pure public good when
he/she must negotiate with beneciaries of the good. In our model, while the level
of the public good is decided unilaterally by the supplier, the cost share of the public
good is negotiated between the supplier and beneciaries. Our bargaining model is
built on simultaneous bilateral bargaining and the bargaining power of the supplier
is a key factor for the analysis. We show that under some mild conditions, the sup-
plier produces the public good at a Pareto-ecient level in equilibrium if and only
if his/her bargaining power is suciently weak. In addition, under some reasonable
parametric functions, we show that the equilibrium likelihood of the ecient provision
of the public good diminishes as the number of beneciaries increases. We show by a
numerical example that the source of the inecient provision of the public good when
the supplier's bargaining power is suciently strong may be the excessive supply of
the public good.
Keywords Public good; Simultaneous bilateral bargaining; Supplier bargaining power;
Nash bargaining solution.
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1 Introduction
We consider a situation in which there is a single supplier of a pure public good and
beneciaries of the good. The supplier unilaterally decides the level of the public good
and the cost of the public good is distributed to the beneciaries through negotiation. We
investigate under which conditions the supplier decides to provide the public good at a
Pareto-ecient level given cost-sharing negotiation.
As an example of our situation, we consider a public project with interregional spillover.
In a given country, there is a river that passes through region U in its upstream area and
regions D1{D3 in its downstream area, as depicted in Figure 1. The central government
constructs a dam in region U for river administration, which benets region U as well as
the downstream regions. Although the central government unilaterally decides the scale
of the dam, the cost of the dam is shared by each regional government. The central
government bilaterally negotiates how to share the cost with each regional government.
When the central government cares about the budget surplus (the sum of transfers from
the regional governments minus the cost of the public good), does the central government
achieve the ecient provision of the public good? The analysis of our situation seems
signicant from the viewpoint of the provision of public goods in the real world. To the
best of our knowledge, there are few models to capture such bargaining situations.
hInsert Figure 1 herei
In the real world, we can observe intergovernmental negotiations on cost sharing when
the central government undertakes public projects of river administration that benet
multiple districts. In Japan, according to the River Act, the central government can force
the local government of the district where the project is undertaken (region U in the above
example) to defray some xed rate of the cost. The central government can also demand
compensation from other local governments beneting from spillover of the project (the
local governments in the downstream area in the above example). However, the River Act
does not clarify the specic rules of such compensation.1 According to Kobayashi and
Ishida (2012), for most central government projects that benet several prefectures, the
ways to share costs are negotiated between the regional development bureaus, which are
delegated by the central government, and the relevant prefectures.2
To address these questions, we construct a three-stage game with complete information.
Players are the single supplier of a pure public good and consumers (beneciaries) who
benet from the public good but cannot produce the good on their own. In the rst stage,
1Articles 59, 60, and 63 of the River Act require cost sharing for river administration. Kobayashi and
Ishida (2012) summarize the rule in Section III{4. In addition, the Road Act has similar clauses for road
administration (see Section IV{4 in Kobayashi and Ishida, 2012).
2As another example, we can consider the construction of the new national stadium in Tokyo. The
scale of the stadium is decided by the Japan Sport Council, which is an extra-governmental organization
of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), but the division of the
construction cost is now being negotiated between the MEXT and the Tokyo metropolitan government.
The total cost of the stadium's construction has been estimated at 169.2 billion yen. Because the stadium
signicantly benets the Tokyo area, the central government has asked the Tokyo metropolitan government
to pay 50 billion yen toward the construction cost. (See: \Govt to talk with Masuzoe on new venue," The
Japan News. February 28, 2014.)
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the supplier plans the level of the public good. The supplier does not incur costs at this
stage. The nal decision is made in the third stage. In the second stage, the supplier
bilaterally and simultaneously negotiates with each consumer about his/her contribution
to the level of the public good decided in the rst stage. In this stage, if n consumers
exist, the supplier has n simultaneous bilateral bargaining sessions. When negotiating, the
supplier and each consumer in the session anticipate the outcome of the other bilateral
bargaining sessions since all sessions are simultaneous. The anticipation by one session for
the other sessions aects the surplus of this session. In equilibrium, each session correctly
anticipates the outcome of the other sessions. We assume that through a Nash bargaining
solution, each session shares the surplus correctly anticipated. The supplier and consumer
in each session share the surplus in proportion to their bargaining powers, which are given
exogenously. In the third stage, given the level of the public good in the rst stage and the
transfers from the consumers in the second stage, the supplier decides whether he/she will
provide the public good at the level decided at the rst stage. His/her payo comprises
the total transfers from consumers minus the cost of the public good if he/she provides
the public good, and zero otherwise.
The relationship between the supplier's decision about the public good and his/her
bargaining power is of interest to us. In intergovernmental negotiations in the real world,
various factors would inuence the relative powers of negotiators, for example, economic
size, population size, and capabilities of governments, such as bargaining skills and in-
formation possessed by government negotiators (see, e.g., Schneider, 2005; Bailer, 2010).
Some scholars state that another important bargaining power source is the saliency that
each government attaches to a negotiation. Keohane and Nye (1977) contend that coun-
tries that are highly interested in a negotiation topic are forced to make larger concessions.
Their view is consistent with some studies of a game-theoretic analysis of bargaining, such
as Rubinstein (1982), which states that a less patient player gains less in bargaining if
a bargaining participant that has a higher interest in the negotiation topic is eager to
reach an agreement at an earlier round of the negotiation (thus, he/she is less patient).
Some real-world intergovernmental negotiations have been studied in relation to bargain-
ing powers (e.g., Moravcsik, 1993; Schneider et al., 2010).
Our results show that the supplier's bargaining power is a key factor for the ecient
provision of the public good. We rst show that under some mild conditions, there is a
threshold value of the supplier's bargaining power below which an equilibrium exists at
which the supplier provides the public good eciently (see Theorem 1). That is, the sup-
plier with \suciently weak" bargaining power provides the public good eciently. This
supplier receives transfers from all consumers and his/her payo is \suciently close to
zero." Interestingly, this result shows that whether the supplier provides the public good
eciently depends crucially on his/her attitude toward budget balance in the negotiation.
We can interpret Theorem 1 as follows: a supplier who is more willing to accept a \su-
ciently near balanced-budget" outcome is more likely to achieve the ecient provision of
the public good (see the third last paragraph in Subsection 3.3).
In addition, we show a numerical example in which the supplier with bargaining power
that is beyond a threshold provides the public good over the ecient level. That is,
the supplier with \suciently strong" bargaining power may provide the public good
excessively (see Subsection 4.2). Moreover, based on Theorem 1, we show that as the
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number of consumers increases, the ecient provision of the public good is less likely to
be observed in equilibrium; however, even if the number of consumers is very large, the
ecient provision of the public good in equilibrium may be observed with a certainly high
likelihood (see Proposition 4 and the discussion thereafter). This shows that there may
be a suciently weak supplier that provides the public good eciently even if he/she
negotiates with many consumers.
Our results show an interesting tendency in terms of bargaining and internalization
of beneciaries' preferences in comparison with Ray and Vohra (1997, 2001) and Dixit
and Olson (2000). Those studies examine public good provision through bargaining un-
der complete information. Ray and Vohra (1997, 2001) introduce two models of coalition
formation in which a grand coalition is the only one that can provide the public good
eciently. They show that in their models, the grand coalition does not necessarily form
in equilibrium owing to free riding. Dixit and Olson (2000) investigate a voluntary par-
ticipation property of ecient bargaining, like Coasian bargaining. They show that the
voluntary participation of players (beneciaries of the public good) is very dicult owing
to free riding, which leads to inecient provision of the public good. Although our model
totally diers from those models, we end up with the same result: that bargaining does
not always achieve eciency. However, we must note that the reason is completely dif-
ferent. In the existing research, the ineciency is due to the failure of the internalization
of beneciaries' preferences. In Ray and Vohra's models, if the grand coalition forms,
the bargaining within the coalition internalizes the preferences of all beneciaries and this
provides the public good eciently. However, the grand coalition does not form; hence,
the internalization fails. A similar argument applies to Dixit and Olson (2000). On the
other hand, in our model, in equilibrium, the supplier sets the public good in the rst
stage so that he/she receives transfers from all consumers; when this occurs, their pref-
erences are considered in the supplier's objective (see (3) at m = n). In this sense, the
internalization of the consumer's preferences succeeds through bargaining. Nevertheless,
the supplier may not provide the public good eciently. This is related to the supplier's
incentive to provide a suciently high level of the public good.3 Proposition 4 in this
study contributes to the literature of the group size eects of public good provision after
the seminal work by Olson (1965), as well as Chamberlin (1974), Bergstrom et al. (1986),
Pecorino and Temimi (2008), and Pecorino (2015). In Subsection 4.1, we discuss the group
size eect in our model in comparison with Dixit and Olson (2000).
In addition, studies of interregional negotiation over public good provision in political
economics are relevant to us. Lulfesmann (2002), Gradstein (2004), and Luelfesmann et
al. (2015) study interregional negotiation between a region providing a public good (the
\supplier," in our terminology) and the region beneting from it (the \consumer," in our
terminology). However, their concern and ours are very dierent. Their objective is to
analyze to what extent the bargaining outcome is distorted by political factors, such as
strategic delegation and majority decisions that neglect minorities. Although we are not
concerned with distortion by political factors, we obtain an implication for this line of
research, which is discussed in Subsection 5.4.
Our results have similarities and dissimilarities with the results in some studies of
vertical contracting with externalities. The common agency game is a noncooperative
3Refer to the discussion immediately after Theorem 1.
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game model of vertical contracting. When the game is applied to public good provision,
rst, each beneciary of a public good simultaneously oers a schedule of contributions
to the public good to a prot-maximizing supplier of it. The schedule is contingent on a
public good level that the supplier provides in the next stage. Second, given the oered
schedules, the supplier chooses the level of the public good and provides it at that level.4
The results of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Laussel and Le Breton (2001) are
applicable to public good provision. By their results, the common agency game always
has a Nash equilibrium at which the supplier provides the public good eciently (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1986). The supplier's payo at the Nash equilibrium is zero if beneciaries
have comonotonic benet functions (Laussel and Le Breton, 2001).5 A common feature
between the common agency game for public good provision and ours is that the public
good is provided by a single supplier. However, the transfers to the supplier are determined
in totally dierent ways. This dierence leads to dierent results. What is interesting
is that in our model, although comonotonicity holds, the supplier does not necessarily
provide the public good eciently or his/her payo is not necessarily zero in equilibrium.
Hence, the supplier's decision for the public good and his/her payo in equilibrium changes
according to the interaction between the supplier and beneciaries. Another interesting
point is that in our model, the supplier also provides the public good eciently when
his/her equilibrium payo is \suciently close" to zero, although our game diers from
the common agency game. In this sense, in our model too, the ecient provision of the
public good seems to be related to the \zero-payo property" of the supplier.6
Segal (1999) investigates vertical contracting through the ultimatum game under some
general setting, which is applicable to public good provision. When this game is applied to
public good provision, in the rst stage, the supplier of a public good makes oers on the
level of the public good as well as transfers from beneciaries to the supplier, and then,
each beneciary independently decides to accept the oers or not. The take-it-or-leave-it
oers mean that the supplier has complete bargaining power. By Proposition 2 of Segal
(1999), in equilibrium of the oer game, the supplier of the public good with complete
bargaining power never produces the public good over the ecient level. By contrast,
in our model, the supplier with suciently strong bargaining power may oversupply the
public good. We carefully discuss the dierence in the results in Section 4.2.
Finally, we mention some other related studies. Based on the simultaneous bilateral
bargaining model, Chipty and Snyder (1999), Raskovich (2003), and Matsushima and
Shinohara (2014) study vertical contracting between the supplier of an intermediate good
and its buyers, while Marshall and Merlo (2004) investigate pattern bargaining of labor
contracts. Brito and Oakland (1980) and Brennan and Walsh (1981) study the monop-
olistic provision of excludable public goods. None of them study the provision of pure
public goods. Raskovich (2001), a working-paper version of Raskovich (2003), examines a
4Laussel and Le Breton (1998) and Martimort and Moreira (2010) examine public good provision by
the common agency under incomplete information while Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Laussel and
Le Breton (2001) analyze such provision under complete information. Our model is based on the complete
information game.
5In a one-dimensional public good space, comonotonicity requires that if the level of the public good
increases, then the benet from it for all consumers increases. In the model of this study, this condition
also holds.
6We present a relevant discussion in the third last paragraph of Subsection 3.3.
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voluntary contribution game to a discrete pure public good, which completely diers from
our model built on simultaneous bilateral bargaining.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model and Section 3 presents its results. Section 4 presents an analysis under parametric
functions. Section 5 discusses the extension of the basic model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy with a pure public good and a private good (money), with a supplier
of the public good and n  2 consumers of the public good. Only the supplier can provide
the public good. To consume the public good, each consumer needs to pay some amount
of money and delegate the provision of it to the supplier. The supplier's objective is
assumed to maximize the budget surplus (the sum of the payments from consumers minus
the cost of the public good). The supplier provides the public good since he/she can
receive transfers from consumers by providing it.7
The set of players is denoted by fs; 1; : : : ; ng, where s represents the supplier and i
(i = 1; : : : ; n) represents a consumer. Let N be the set of consumers. Then, the set
of players is denoted by fsg [ N . The level of the public good is typically denoted by
g  0 and consumer i's transfer to the supplier is denoted by Ti. The cost function of
the public good is denoted by c : R+ ! R+ such that c(0) = 0, c is an increasing, convex
(sometimes, weakly convex), and twice continuously dierentiable function. When the
supplier provides g units of the public good and receives payment Ti from each i 2 N , its
payo is
P
i2N Ti  c(g). Each consumer i receives payo v(g) Ti, where v : R+ ! R+ is
a benet function from the public good such that v(0) = 0 and v is an increasing, concave
(sometimes, weakly concave), twice continuously dierentiable function. Note that in this
model, each consumer has the same benet function v. We further impose the following
conditions on v(g) and c(g).
Assumption 1
(1.1) [ limg!0 v0(g) = 1, limg!1 v0(g) = 0, limg!0 c0(g) = 0, and limg!1 c0(g) = 1 ],
[limg!0 v0(g) =1, limg!1 v0(g) = 0, and c0(g) is nite] or [v0(g) is nite, limg!0 c0(g) = 0,
and limg!1 c0(g) =1].
(1.2) For all g > 0,
c0(g)
c(g)
>
v0(g)
v(g)
:
Condition (1.1) guarantees interior solutions of the model. Condition (1.2) implies that
c(g)=v(g) is increasing in g, which is crucial for the subsequent analysis. We consider
these conditions not to be restrictive because they are satised by many benet and cost
functions. For example, the assumptions are satised if v(g) = g and c(g) = g where
, , , and  are positive constants such that  2 (0; 1],   1, and  6=  (see also
Proposition 3 in Subsection 4.1). By the l'Ho^pital's rule and (1.1), we obtain
lim
g!0
c(g)
v(g)
= 0: (1.3)
7A discussion on the supplier's objective is presented in Section 5.
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We model a three-stage game to analyze public good provision through simultaneous
bilateral bargaining. In the rst stage, the supplier chooses the level of the public good
g  0. In this stage, the supplier does not provide the public good at this level or incur
the cost. He/she makes a nal decision for public good provision in the third stage. In
the second stage, the supplier and each consumer i 2 N bilaterally and simultaneously
negotiate over the division of the joint surplus, so that Ti  0 (a transfer from consumer
i to the supplier) is determined. Note that in this stage, the supplier faces n independent
bilateral negotiations. We assume that the outcome of the second stage is determined
as follows. First, the outcome of each negotiation is given by the (asymmetric) Nash
bargaining solution, in the belief that the bargaining outcomes with the other parties
are determined in the same way. Second, the joint surplus of one bilateral bargaining is
divided between the consumer and the supplier in the proportion of 1   to , in which
 2 [0; 1] represents the supplier's bargaining power. In the third stage, the supplier
decides whether to execute a project (g; (Ti)i2N ), a tuple of the level of the public good,
and the transfers. If he/she executes the project, then he/she provides g units of the
public good and receives Ti from each consumer i. As a result, the supplier's payo isP
i2N Ti   c(g) and each consumer i's payo is v(g)   Ti. Otherwise, no public good is
provided and no money is transferred. Then, the supplier's and each consumer's payos
are zero.
We solve this game by backward induction. We simply solve the supplier's payo max-
imization problem in the rst and third stages. We examine the second-stage outcome by
simultaneously applying the Nash bargaining solution to each bilateral negotiation. Under
simultaneous bilateral negotiations, the negotiators in each bilateral negotiation need to
anticipate the outcomes of the other negotiations. The anticipation of one negotiation
aects the disagreement payo and the surplus of the negotiation. If a consumer and the
supplier in a negotiation anticipate that the other consumers' transfer covers the cost of the
public good c(g), then this consumer can free ride the public good. Thus, this consumer's
disagreement payo is the free-riding payo v(g). The supplier can receive
P
j 6=i Tj even
if he/she does not reach an agreement with this consumer. Thus, the supplier's disagree-
ment payo is
P
j 6=i Tj   c(g). By contrast, if the negotiators anticipate that the other
consumers' transfers fall short of the cost, then the failure of their negotiation means that
no public good is provided and no transfer is made. Hence, the disagreement payos to the
supplier and the consumer are both zero. The joint surplus of each bilateral negotiation
also depends on the anticipation of the other negotiations, accordingly. When applying
the Nash bargaining solution to all negotiations, we assume that the negotiators in each
bilateral negotiation have consistent beliefs about the other negotiations: the outcome of
each negotiation is predicted correctly by the others.8
A noncooperative foundation for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution has been
presented by several studies. As Binmore et al. (1986) show, the subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcome in Rubinstein's bargaining model with alternating oers and risk of break-
down approximates the Nash bargaining solution. In addition, in Binmore et al. (1986, pp.
186{187), the relationship between the Nash bargaining solution and asymmetric bargain-
8The method of simultaneous application of the Nash bargaining solution follows Chipty and Snyder
(1999) and Raskovich (2003). However, note that in their models, free riding is impossible. See, for
example, the condition \vi(0; q i) = 0" in Raskovich (2003, p. 410, 12th line from the bottom).
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ing power is discussed. Hence, we can approximately interpret that in the second-stage
game of our model, each pair of supplier and consumer plays the alternating oer bargain-
ing game with risk of breakdown, anticipating the other sessions' outcomes. Therefore,
our solution by backward induction is consistent with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Analysis
The analysis for  = 0 is trivial since the supplier's payo is always zero for any of his/her
choices of g in the rst stage. We focus on the case of  2 (0; 1].
We rst show that under some condition introduced as Condition 1 later, a threshold
value of the supplier's bargaining power  exists such that if 0    , there is an
equilibrium at which the public good is provided eciently (Proposition 1). We construct
the equilibrium by backward induction.
3.1 The third stage: The supplier's execution
We start with the third stage. Clearly, given (g; (Ti)i2N ), the supplier executes it ifP
i2N Ti > c(g), he/she is indierent between execution and nonexecution if
P
i2N Ti =
c(g), and he/she does not execute otherwise. Henceforth, we assume that when
P
i2N Ti =
c(g), the supplier does not execute.
3.2 The second stage: Simultaneous bilateral bargaining
3.2.1 Second-stage equilibria
In the second stage, who contributes to the project and how much money each contributor
transfers to the supplier are determined. Who contributes to the project depends on who
is pivotal to the project, dened below.
Denition. Let g  0 be a level of the public good. Let Tj be a transfer from con-
sumer j 2 N . Consumer i 2 N is pivotal to the execution of the project (g; (Tj)j2N ) ifP
j2Nnfig Tj  c(g) <
P
j2N Tj .
The pivotal consumers are dened based on the third-stage equilibrium.9 The transfer
from the pivotal consumer is necessary for the supplier to provide the public good. If
the bargaining with the pivotal consumer breaks down, the supplier does not execute the
project in the third stage.
We derive the level of transfer from each consumer to the supplier. We rst consider
the case in which consumer i is not pivotal to the project (g; (Tj)j2N ), that is, the case
in which either
P
j2N Tj  c(g) or
P
j2Nnfig Tj > c(g) is satised. In the former case, the
supplier chooses not to execute at the third stage. Hence, the surplus of the bargaining
is zero. The latter case means that the supplier executes the project at the third stage,
irrespective of whether the bargaining with consumer i succeeds. Hence, the supplier's net
surplus from this bargaining is Ti +
P
j 6=i Tj   c(g)  (
P
j 6=i Tj   c(g)) = Ti and consumer
i's net surplus is v(g)   Ti   v(g) =  Ti; the joint surplus of this bargaining is zero. In
9The denition of the pivotal consumers is the same as that of Raskovich (2003).
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any case, the joint surplus of the bargaining with the nonpivotal consumer i is zero, which
implies Ti = 0; consumer i free rides the public good.
We next consider the case in which consumer i is pivotal to (g; (Tj)j2N ), that is, the
case in which
P
j2Nnfig Tj  c(g) <
P
j2N Tj . In this case, if this bargaining breaks down,
then the supplier chooses nonexecution in the third stage and the supplier's and consumer
i's disagreement payos are zero. If an agreement is reached in the bargaining, then the
supplier's payo is
P
j2N Tj   c(g) and consumer i's payo is v(g)   Ti. Then, the joint
surplus of this bargaining is
v(g)  Ti + Ti +
X
j2Nnfig
Tj   c(g) = v(g) +
X
j2Nnfig
Tj   c(g):
This joint surplus is divided between the supplier and consumer i in the proportion of 
and 1  . Hence,
Ti = v(g) (1 )
0@v(g) + X
j2Nnfig
Tj   c(g)
1A = v(g)+(1 )c(g) (1 ) X
j2Nnfig
Tj : (1)
Finally, we examine how many consumers become pivotal and how much money the
pivotal consumers transfer to the supplier. Suppose thatm pivotal consumers (1  m  n)
exist. Let M  N be the set of pivotal consumers. Since condition (1) holds for all m
consumers, solving the system of those equations yields (Tmj )j2M such that for each j 2M ,
Tmj =
v(g) + (1  )c(g)
 + (1  )m (> 0 if g > 0): (2)
The payo to the supplier is
mS (g) =
X
j2M
Tmj   c(g) =
(mv(g)  c(g))
 + (1  )m ; (3)
the payo to the pivotal consumer i 2M is
v(g)  Tmi =
(1  )(mv(g)  c(g))
 + (1  )m ; (4)
and the payo to the nonpivotal consumer i 2 NnM is v(g) (The superscript \m" of Tmj
and mS refers to the number of pivotal consumers). Henceforth, we call pivotal consumers
contributors and nonpivotal consumers free riders.
The sum of the joint surplus of the bargaining sessions with m pivotal consumers is
mv(g)  c(g) and the supplier's share of the surplus and the pivotal consumer's share are
=( + (1   )m) and (1   )=( + (1   )m), respectively. Since  + (1   )m is the
sum of the bargaining powers over the supplier and m pivotal consumers, the surplus is
distributed in proportion to the bargaining power.10
Lemma 1 shows that the equilibrium number of contributors is determined according
to the level of the public good in the rst stage.
10(Tmj )j2M is supportable by other bargaining models. See Subsection 5.1.
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Lemma 1
(1.a) For any given g  0 such that nv(g)  c(g), the equilibrium number of contributors
at g is zero.
(1.b) For any given g > 0 such that nv(g) > c(g), m is the equilibrium number of contrib-
utors at g if and only if
c(g)
v(g)
< m  c(g)
v(g)
+ 1: (5)
At least one integer m exists that satises (5).
Proof. (1.a) If g satises nv(g)  c(g), there is no surplus in any bilateral bargaining.
Hence, no consumer pays a positive fee; the number of contributors is zero.
(1.b) m is the number of contributors if and only if
P
j2M T
m
j   Tmi  c(g) <P
j2M T
m
j for each i 2M . From (2), these inequalities hold if and only if (m  1)v(g) 
c(g) < mv(g), implying (5). Clearly, an integer m exists that satises c(g)=v(g) < m 
(c(g)=v(g)) + 1. Hence, at least one integer m exists that satises (5) since   1.

Note that if nv(g) > c(g), then the pivotal condition restricts the number of contrib-
utors, which means that the supplier does not necessarily receive positive transfers from
all consumers. We summarize the second-stage equilibria as follows:
The second-stage equilibria. After the supplier decides the level of the public good g
in the rst stage, the equilibrium outcome of the second-stage subgame is (M; (Tmj )j2N )
where M is the set of contributors, the equilibrium number of contributors m = jM j is
determined according to Lemma 1, and the equilibrium transfer is
Tmj =
8><>:
v(g) + (1  )c(g)
 + (1  )m if j 2M;
0 if j 2 NnM:
(6)
3.2.2 A second-stage equilibrium that maximizes the supplier's payo
Note that for some level of the public good in the rst stage, there may be multiple
second-stage equilibria that support dierent equilibrium numbers of contributors because
(5) may include multiple integers. For the backward induction analysis, we focus on the
equilibrium that maximizes the supplier's payo among the second-stage equilibria in every
second-stage subgame.
To investigate which second-stage equilibrium maximizes the supplier's payo, we start
with the restatement of (5), which is based on the level of the public good. Dene gm for
each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng and gm for each m 2 f2; : : : ; ng such that
m =
c(gm)
v(gm)
and m =
c(gm)
v(gm)
+ 1: (7)
Note that c(g)=v(g) is increasing in g by (1.2) in Assumption 1. Thus, by (1.2) in As-
sumption 1 and (1.3), gm can be dened uniquely for each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng and gm can be
dened uniquely for each m 2 f2; : : : ; ng. We adopt the convention that g1  0 by (1.3).
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Lemma 2
(2.a) For any given g > 0 such that nv(g) > c(g), m is the equilibrium number of contrib-
utors at g if and only if
gm  g < gm: (5')
(2.b) For each m 2 f2; : : : ; ng, gm < gm 1 if  < 1 and gm = gm 1 if  = 1.
Proof. (2.a) is the restatement of (1.b) in Lemma 1. We now show (2.b). By the
denition, c(gm 1)=v(gm 1) = m  1 and c(gm)=(v(gm)) = m  1. By those conditions,
we obtainc(gm)=v(gm) = (m   1)  m   1 = c(gm 1)=v(gm 1). Since c(g)=v(g) is
increasing in g, we obtain gm  gm 1. 
Lemma 2 shows that gm and gm make the lower and upper bounds of the public
good level where m is the equilibrium number of contributors in the second stage. In
addition, Lemma 2 shows the condition under which the second-stage subgame has mul-
tiple equilibria that support dierent numbers of contributors. (2.b) shows that for each
m 2 f2; : : : ; ng, gm 1  g < gm 1 (the range of m 1 contributors) and gm  g < gm (the
range of m contributors) overlap if and only if  < 1. Thus, in the case of  < 1, if the
supplier chooses g between gm and gm 1 in the rst stage, multiple second-stage equilibria
exist that support the existence of m   1 contributors and that of m contributors in the
subsequent second stage.
When there are multiple numbers of contributors attained at equilibria of a second-
stage subgame, we focus on the equilibrium that maximizes the supplier's payo from
the set of the second-stage equilibria. Lemma 3 is helpful to clarify which second-stage
equilibrium maximizes the supplier's payo.
Lemma 3 For each g > 0 and each m 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g, mS (g)  m+1S (g) with strict
inequality if  > 0.
Proof. From (3), we obtain
m+1S (g) mS (g) =
(v(g) + (1  )c(g))
( + (1  )(m+ 1))( + (1  )m)  0 with strict inequality if  > 0: 
Lemma 3 shows that for each g > 0 , mS (g) is nondecreasing in m. By Lemma 3, in the
second stage, immediately after the supplier chooses g such that nv(g) > c(g), the second-
stage equilibrium that maximizes the supplier's payo within the set of the second-stage
equilibria is the equilibrium at which the number of contributors is the maximal integer
among m that satises (5).
The selected second-stage equilibrium. For each g  0, denote the equilibrium
number of contributors by m(g) 2 f0; : : : ; ng. After the supplier decides the level of the
public good g in the rst stage, the equilibrium outcome of the second-stage subgame is
(M; (T
m(g)
j )j2N ) whereM is the set of contributors, the equilibrium number of contributors
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m(g) = jM j is
m(g) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if g = g1 (= 0);
1 if g 2 (g1; g2);
k if g 2 [gk; gk+1) (k 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g);
n if g 2 [gn; gn);
0 if g  gn;
(8)
and equilibrium transfer (T
m(g)
j )j2N conforms to (6).
We can learn from (8) that the supplier does not always receive transfers from all
consumers. The equilibrium number of contributors increases as the level of the public
good increases; hence, the supplier sets the level of the public good \suciently high" if
he/she receives transfers from all consumers.
Finally, we remark that we do not explicitly model how the supplier selects m(g)
contributors out of n identical consumers when 0 < m(g) < n. However, note that since
the consumers are identical, the way to select contributors does not aect the main results
of this study. The random selection of m(g) consumers out of n consumers could be one
of the ways to select.
3.3 The rst stage: The supplier's decision about the level of the public
good
Given that the supplier receives transfers from m(g) contributors in the second stage for
each g  0, we investigate the public good level that maximizes the supplier's payo.
3.3.1 Some preliminaries
As a reference level for the optimal g for the supplier, we dene
g(m)  argmax
g0
mv(g)  c(g):
From the maximization problem, there are several observations, as follows.
1. By (3), if the number of contributors is xed at m, then mS (g) is maximized at
g = g(m).
This implies that mS (g) is increasing in g 2 [0; g(m)) and decreasing in g 2 [g(m);1).
2. g(m) < g(m+ 1) for each m 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g.
3. g(n) is the (Pareto) ecient level of the public good because g(n) maximizes nv(g) 
c(g).
Corollary 1 shows that mS (g(m)) is increasing in m.
Corollary 1 For each m 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g, mS (g(m)) < m+1S (g(m+ 1)).
Proof. By Lemma 3, mS (g(m))  m+1S (g(m)). From the abovementioned rst and
second observations, m+1S (g(m)) < 
m+1
S (g(m+ 1)). 
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Assumption 1 ensures that c(g)=v(g) has an inverse function and by (7), it is given as
G() such that
gm = G((m  1)):
Obviously, G((m  1)) is continuous and increasing in the value of (m  1).
For each g  0 and m 2 (1; n], dene (g;m) 2 R+ such that
(g;m)  c(g)
v(g)
 1
m  1 : (9)
Note that if  = (g;m), g = gm (= G ((g;m)(m  1))). Up to now, we have supposed
that m is an integer. However, even if we extend m in the domain of (g;m) to real
numbers greater than one, we can also dene (g;m). For mathematical tractability, we
suppose that m of (g;m) is a real number greater than one.
We now examine how  (g(m);m) and  (g(m);m+ 1) react to the change of m.11
As we see later,  (g(m);m) marks the threshold level of the supplier's bargaining power
below which the supplier produces the public good eciently. By (9),
 (g(m);m) =
c(g(m))
v(g(m))
 1
m  1 and  (g(m);m+ 1) =
c(g(m))
v(g(m))
 1
m
: (10)
Thus,
g(m) = gm when  =  (g(m);m) and (11)
g(m) = gm+1 when  =  (g(m);m+ 1) : (12)
By dierentiating (10) with respect to m, we obtain Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 It follows that
@(g(m);m)
@m
< 0 if and only if
dg(m)
dm
<
@ G ((m  1))
@ m

(m 1)=(g(m);m)(m 1)
(13)
and
@(g(m);m+ 1)
@m
< 0 if and only if
dg(m)
dm
<
@G (m)
@m

m=(g(m);m+1)m
: (14)
Proof of Lemma 4 is in the Appendix. The magnitude of the relationship between the
dierential coecient of g(m) and that of G((m   1)) is not clear. Hence, we need to
consider various cases on the slope of (g(m);m) and (g(m);m + 1) in m. Henceforth,
our analysis is built on the following \reasonable" condition.
Condition 1 (g(m);m) and (g(m);m+ 1) are nonincreasing in m.
(13) and (14) provide an economic interpretation of Condition 1. dg(m)=dm measures a
marginal increase in the ecient level of the public good through a marginal increase in m
under m contributors. Note that G((m  1)) (G(m), resp.) is the minimum level of the
public good at which m (m+1, resp.) consumers contribute. In other words, G((m 1))
(G(m), resp.) is the level that is needed for none of m (m+ 1, resp.) consumers to free
11Note that g(m) can be dened for any real number m > 1.
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ride. Hence, @G((m   1))=@m (@G(m)=@m, resp.) is a marginal increase in the level
of the public good through a marginal increase in m such that none of m (m + 1, resp.)
consumers to free ride. (13) ((14), resp.) imposes that the marginal increase of the public
good to prevent m contributors from free riding must be larger than that to supply the
public good eciently under m contributors. Furthermore, Condition 1 is satised under
many benet and cost functions (see Proposition 3 in Subsection 4.1). For analytical
completeness, we discuss the case without Condition 1 in the nal paragraph of Section 3.
Lemma 5 shows the relative relationship between (g(m);m) and (g(m);m+ 1).
Lemma 5
(5.a) lim
m!1
 (g(m);m) =1 and lim
m!1
 (g(m);m+ 1) =
c(g(1))
v(g(1))
.
(5.b) For each m > 1,  (g(m);m+ 1) <  (g(m);m).
Proof. (5.a) By (10), as m! 1,
 (g(m);m) =
c(g(m))
v(g(m))(m  1) !1 and  (g(m);m+ 1) =
c(g(m))
v(g(m))m
! c(g(1))
v(g(1))
:
(5.b) is immediate from (10). 
Figure 2 is an example that reects Lemma 5 and Condition 1. Let 0 2 (0; 1] be a
xed value of bargaining power. This gure illustrates a case in which (g(m);m) and
(g(m);m+ 1) are decreasing in m and there are m0 and m00 such that (g(m0);m0) = 0
and (g(m00);m00 + 1) = 0.
hInsert Figure 2 herei
Note that while g(m) is dependent on m but independent of , gm (= G((m   1)))
and gm+1 (= G(m)) depend on m and . Lemma 6 shows how the relationship between
g(m) and gm (or gm+1) changes according to the values of m and .
Lemma 6 Let  2 (0; 1] and m 2 (1; n]. Then,
gm+1  g(m) if    (g(m);m+ 1) ; (15)
gm  g(m) < gm+1 if  (g(m);m+ 1) <    (g(m);m) ; and (16)
g(m) < gm if  >  (g(m);m) : (17)
Proof. By (11) and (12),
g(m) = G ( (g(m);m) (m  1)) and g(m) = G ( (g(m);m+ 1)m) :
Since G ((m  1)) and G (m) are increasing in , we obtain g(m) < G((m  1)) = gm
if and only if  > (g(m);m); g(m) < G(m) = gm+1 if and only if  > (g(m);m+ 1).
Thus, we obtain (15){(17). 
Lemma 7 shows what level of the public good g maximizes mS (g) under the constraint
g 2 [gm; gm+1) for each m and .
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Lemma 7 Let m 2 f1; : : : ; ng and  2 (0; 1]. Then,
(7.a) If    (g(m);m+ 1), then gm+1  g(m) (see (15)); hence, mS (g) is increasing
within the interval [gm; gm+1). Thus, there is no maximizer when restricting to this
interval.
(7.b) If  (g(m);m+ 1) <    (g(m);m), then g(m) 2 [gm; gm+1) (see (16)); hence,
within the interval [gm; gm+1), mS (g) is maximized at g = g(m).
(7.c) If  (g(m);m) < , then g(m) < gm (see (17)); hence, within the interval [gm; gm+1),
mS (g) is maximized at g = g
m .
3.3.2 Analysis of the supplier's choice of the level of the public good
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 and Condition 1, in the rst stage induced by the
second- and third-stage equilibrium, g(n) maximizes the supplier's payo if  satises12
0    min
m2f1;:::;ng
 (g(m);m) : (18)
Therefore, if  satises (18), then an equilibrium exists at which the supplier produces the
public good eciently.
Imposing an additional condition for monotonicity of mS (Condition 2 below), we
show (18) is also a necessary condition for the existence of equilibria at which the supplier
provides the ecient level of the public good.
Condition 2 mS (g
m) < m+1S (g
m+1) for each m 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and Conditions 1{2, an equilibrium exists at which
the supplier produces the public good eciently only if  satises (18).
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are in the Appendix. We immediately obtain Theorem
1 from Propositions 1 and 2.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1 and Conditions 1{2, an equilibrium exists at which the
supplier produces the ecient level of the public good (g(n)) if and only if  satises
0    minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m) =  (g(n); n).
As Theorem 1 proves, (g(n); n) marks the threshold value of the supplier's bargaining
power below which the supplier produces the public good eciently. The supplier provides
the public good eciently at an equilibrium if and only if his/her bargaining power is
\suciently weak" under several assumptions and conditions. At this equilibrium, the
supplier receives transfers from all consumers, as we see in the proof of Proposition 1, and
his/her payo is \suciently close" to zero because  is suciently small.
We present an intuition of Theorem 1. We can conrm from Lemma 3 that for any
level of the public good, the more consumers from which the supplier receives transfers,
the higher is the supplier's payo; hence, the supplier desires to receive transfers from all
12We adopt the convention that (g(1); 1) =1 for mathematical consistency.
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consumers. Since the public good is pure, the supplier must set the level of the public good
\suciently high" in order to receive transfers from all consumers; if the level of the public
good is low so that the cost of the public good is compensated by the transfers from fewer
than n consumers, then free riders exist. However, there is another problem: the supplier
may choose an excessively higher level of the public good. If the supplier's bargaining
power is strong, the transfers from contributors are large. Then, there may be a case in
which the cost of g(n) is compensated by fewer than n consumers. In this case, even if
the supplier chooses g(n), there are free riders. Then, the supplier sets the level of the
public good over g(n) to eliminate the free riders because he/she wants to receive transfers
from all consumers. This leads to excessive provision of the public good.13 Therefore, the
supplier provides the public good eciently if and only if his/her bargaining power is
suciently weak such that the cost of g(n) is compensated by all consumers, but not by
fewer than n consumers.
We can interpret Theorem 1 in relation to the eciency of the supplier's decision
and his/her \willingness" to accept budget balance. Suppose that the supplier receives
transfers from m consumers. By (2), if  = 0, each contributor pays c(g)=m and the sum
of the transfers is equal to c(g); this supplier accepts budget balance through negotiation.
If  = 1, the supplier extracts full benets v(g) from all m consumers; this supplier does
not accept budget balance through negotiation. Since each consumers' transfer decreases
in , and hence, the budget surplus also decreases, we can interpret that the weaker the
supplier's bargaining power is, the nearer to a balanced-budget outcome will the supplier
accept in the negotiation. From this viewpoint, we conclude that if a supplier is willing
to accept a \suciently near" balanced-budget outcome, he/she is more likely to achieve
the ecient provision of the public good.
Note that Condition 2 is imposed only in Proposition 2. As we see in Proposition 3 in
Subsection 4.1, Condition 2 is satised under various benet and cost functions.
Finally, we mention how the results change without Condition 1.14 Even if Condition
1 is violated, we can show that the supplier supplies the public good eciently if his/her
bargaining power is suciently weak. Hence, a similar result to Proposition 1 holds in
the case. However, we point out the possibility that the supplier supplies the public good
eciently even if his/her bargaining power is suciently strong; the result may be dierent
from Proposition 2 if Condition 1 is not satised. Again, we emphasize that Condition
1 is reasonable in our analysis because it satises the reasonable parametric benet and
cost functions, which are introduced in Section 4.
4 Analysis under parametric functions
4.1 Number of consumers and likelihood of allocative eciency
We consider an example in which v(g) = g and c(g) = g, where , , , and  are
positive constants such that  2 (0; 1],   1, and  6= . Note that v(g) and c(g) satisfy
13In Subsection 4.2, we provide an example in which the public good is excessively provided in equilib-
rium.
14The formal analysis for this paragraph is available upon request
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Assumption 1. From (7) and (10), we obtain
gm =

(m  1)

 1
 
; gm =

m

 1
 
; g(m) =

m

 1
 
;
(g;m) =

(m  1)g
 ; (g(m);m) =



1
m  1 + 1

; and (g(m);m+ 1) =


:
(19)
We can see from (19) that (g(m);m) is decreasing in m and (g(m);m+ 1) is constant
in m. Thus, Condition 1 holds. Moreover,
mS (g
m) =

1 + (1  )(m  1)

(m  1)

 
 

m     (m  1)


=

()

 1
 
(m  1)   :
Since =(   ) > 0, mS (gm) is increasing in m. Thus, Condition 2 holds.
Proposition 3 Assumption 1, Conditions 1, and 2 hold if v(g) = g and c(g) = g,
where , , , and  are positive constants such that  2 (0; 1],   1, and  6= .
By Proposition 3, Theorem 1 applies to this example.
Corollary 2 Suppose that v(g) = g and c(g) = g, where , , , and  are positive
constants such that  2 (0; 1],   1, and  6= . The supplier provides the public
good eciently at an equilibrium if and only if  2 [0; (g(n); n)], where (g(n); n) =
n=((n  1)).
Proposition 4 is directly from Corollary 2.
Proposition 4 The set of the supplier's bargaining powers in which the supplier provides
the public good eciently at an equilibrium, [0; (g(n); n)], shrinks and converges to [0; =]
as n becomes large if v(g) = g and c(g) = g, where , , , and  are positive constants
such that  2 (0; 1],   1, and  6= .
By Proposition 4, we can examine the equilibrium likelihood of the ecient provision of
the public good by the supplier. Although there may be various measures for this likelihood
in the literature, the length of the interval [0;  (g(n); n)] would be appropriate as the
measure of this likelihood in our model. Since (g(n); n) decreases in n, the length becomes
shorter as n becomes larger. Thus, we could conclude that the equilibrium likelihood of the
ecient provision of the public good becomes lower as the number of consumers increases.
However, note that the likelihood of the ecient provision of the public good does not
necessarily vanish even if the number of consumers approaches innity. This implies that
there may be a suciently weak supplier who provides the public good eciently even if
he/she negotiates with many consumers.
A comparison of our results with those of Dixit and Olson (2000) might be important
because whether beneciaries are pivotal to public good provision plays a role in both sets
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of results. Dixit and Olson (2000) examine a voluntary participation game in bargaining for
public good provision. In their game, each beneciary simultaneously decides whether to
participate in the bargaining. The public good is discrete: a threshold number exists such
that one unit of the public good is provided if at least the threshold number of beneciaries
participates and no public good is provided otherwise. If the public good is provided, its
cost is shared by participants and nonparticipants can free ride. They assume that the
provision of the public good is ecient. They examine mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
of that game and show that each beneciary's equilibrium probability of participation
diminishes to zero as the number of the players increases. Thus, the likelihood that
the public good is provided eciently in equilibrium is extremely low when the number
of beneciaries is large.15 Intuitively, in their game, the probability of being pivotal to
the public good provision aects the participation probability of each beneciary.16 A
beneciary participates if and only if he/she is pivotal because otherwise, the public good
is not provided or he/she cannot benet from it. As the number of beneciaries increases,
the probability of being pivotal becomes lower, which reduces each player's participation
probability.
Note that in our analysis, the probability of being pivotal is irrelevant. As discussed
in Section 3, in our model, the supplier has an incentive to set the level of the public good
such that all consumers are pivotal to the provision of the public good. This is the same,
even when the number of consumers is very large. Hence, Proposition 4 comes from a
dierent reason to that of Dixit and Olson (2000).
Although our model and measurement of likelihood of eciency are completely dif-
ferent from Dixit and Olson's (2000), we share a similar implication: as the number of
consumers (beneciaries) increases, the likelihood of achieving eciency in equilibrium
decreases. Our result diers from that of Dixit and Olson (2000) in that the likelihood of
the ecient provision of the public good does not necessarily vanish even if the number
of consumers becomes large. Note that = is close to one if  and  are close to one.
4.2 Equilibrium level of the public good when the supplier's bargaining
power is suciently strong
Theorem 1 proves that if  > minm2f1;:::;ng (g(m);m), there is no equilibrium that sup-
ports the ecient provision of the public good. We discuss which of underprovision and
overprovision of the public good causes ineciency in public good provision.
Consider an example in which n = 11, v(g) =
p
g and c(g) = g. Then,
g(m) =
m
2
2
; gm = ((m  1))2; (g(m);m) = m
2(m  1) ; and (g(m);m+ 1) =
1
2
:
Note that minm2f1;:::;ng (g(m);m) = (g(11); 11) = 0:55. In the Appendix, we show that
there is an equilibrium at which the supplier chooses g11 in the rst stage. Since g(11) <
g11, the supplier produces the public good over the ecient level at this equilibrium.
15A similar implication can be obtained from the results of the voluntary participation game for a public
good mechanism (Saijo and Yamato, 1999, 2010; Shinohara, 2009; Healy, 2010; Furusawa and Konishi,
2011; Konishi and Shinohara, 2014).
16The meaning of pivotal here is the same as that in our analysis: without a pivotal beneciary, the
public good is not provided.
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Recall that in the paragraphs after Theorem 1, we mentioned that the supplier has an
incentive to increase the level of the public good to receive transfers from all consumers.
This example presents a case in which this incentive leads to the overprovision of the
public good in equilibrium when the supplier's bargaining power is strong.
This example produces a result that diers from that of Segal (1999), who proposes
a vertical contracting model under some general setting, which is applicable to public
good provision. When his model is applied to public good provision, the supplier of
a public good has bilateral negotiations with each consumer; in the bilateral negotiation
with consumer i 2 N , the supplier rst makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer (gi; Ti) to consumer
i, where gi is the individual contribution level of the public good from i and Ti is i's
transfer to the supplier. Each consumer knows the oer to him/her as well as the oers
to the others. Then, each consumer simultaneously decides whether to accept the oer.
All oers that are accepted by consumers are executed: if a set of consumers A  N
accepts the oer, then the total level of the public good is
P
j2A gj , the supplier's payo isP
j2A Tj c(
P
j2A gj), the payo to acceptor i 2 A is v(
P
j2A gj) Ti and that to rejector
l 2 NnA is v(Pj2A gj). Take-it-or-leave-it oers mean that the supplier has complete
bargaining power. By Proposition 2 of Segal (1999), in equilibrium, the supplier with
complete bargaining power never produces the public good over the ecient level. By
contrast, as the abovementioned example shows, in our model, the supplier with complete
bargaining power ( = 1) may overprovide the public good.
In Segal's (1999) model, the reason why the supplier never excessively produces a
public good is that the supplier must care about consumers' free riding. Given that the
supplier makes oers (gj ; Tj)j2N that all consumers accept, if consumer i rejects an oer,
i can enjoy v(
P
j2Nnfig gj) because (gj ; Tj) for each j 2 Nnfig are accepted. Thus, the
supplier with complete bargaining power can extract full marginal benet of consumer i
from accepting the oer, v(
P
j2N gj)   v(
P
j2Nnfig gj), but not full benet, v(
P
j2N gj):
Ti = v(
P
j2N gj)  v(
P
j2Nnfig gj) for each i 2 N in equilibrium.
In our model, when the supplier with complete bargaining power make oers that
the consumers accept, he/she does not have to care about consumers' free riding. This
is because the supplier can make all consumers pivotal to the execution of the project
(g; (Tj))j2N by setting the level of the public good suciently high; if one of the consumers
rejects an oer, then the project is not executed. This means that consumers receive
nothing if they decline the supplier's oer. Thus, the supplier with complete bargaining
power can extract full benet, v(g), from each consumer: Ti = v(g) for each i 2 N .
The transfers that the supplier receives in our model are likely to be greater than those
in Segal's (1999) model. This dierence in transfer values leads to the dierence in the
supplier's decision.
Finally, we note that the possibility cannot be denied that the supplier with strong
bargaining power underprovides the public good under other benet and cost functions.17
Thus, the ineciency in public good provision is due to the overprovision of the public
good in some cases and the underprovision of the public good in other cases.
17The formal analysis of the case in which the supplier has strong bargaining power is available upon
request.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Bargaining procedures
The outcome through simultaneous bilateral bargaining can be obtained through other
multilateral bargaining models.18 First, (2){(4) are consistent with the outcome of mul-
tilateral Nash bargaining among the supplier andm pivotal consumers. We can easily con-
rm that (Tmj )j2M in (2) maximizes the Nash product (
P
j2M Tj c(g))
Q
j2M (v(g)  Tj)1 .
Second, we can conrm that for each level of the public good in the rst stage g  0,
the payos attained at the simultaneous bilateral bargaining belong to the core of the
cooperative game (fsg [ N;wg) where wg : 2fsg[N ! R+ is the characteristic func-
tion such that for any nonempty subset C  N , wg(f;g) = wg(fsg) = wg(C) = 0;
wg(fsg [ C) = maxfjCjv(g)   c(g); 0g where jCj represents the cardinality of C. Thus,
we can say that simultaneous bilateral bargaining provides an outcome attained through
some multilateral negotiation.
We consider other kinds of bargaining models between the supplier and consumers
instead of simultaneous and bilateral bargaining, and we discuss how the main result
changes under other bargaining models.
First, we consider sequential bargaining between the supplier and each consumer. We
replace the second-stage bargaining game of the basic model with the following sequential
bilateral bargaining game: the supplier rst negotiates with consumer 1, second negotiates
with consumer 2 after the bilateral bargaining with consumer 1, ..., and nally, bilaterally
negotiates with consumer n after the bilateral bargaining sessions with the other con-
sumers. Each bilateral bargaining session is assumed to be Nash bargaining. The supplier
has only one bilateral negotiation with each of n consumers. The equilibrium transfer
attained through this sequential bargaining is the same as that in (6). Hence, a result
similar to Theorem 1 can be obtained under sequential bilateral bargaining.
Second, we apply solutions of the cooperative game to the second-stage bargaining.
Since several famous solutions, such as the Shapley value, kernel, and nucleolus, satisfy the
equal treatment property (ETP), we focus on the solution with the ETP.19 Consider the
cooperative game (fsg [N;wg) dened above. Since the consumers have identical benet
functions in the basic model, all distinct consumers i and j are interchangeable in the sense
that for each coalition D  fsg [N that contains neither i nor j, wg(D [ fig) wg(D) =
wg(D [ fjg)   wg(D). The solution of the cooperative game assigns how to distribute
the total surplus wg(fsg [N). If the solution satises the ETP, then it assigns the same
distribution to all interchangeable players (i.e., all consumers in our model). Formally, let
(ui)i2fsg[N 2 Rn+1+ be payos that are assigned by the solution with the ETP and that
satisfy us +
P
i2N ui = w
g(fsg [N). Then, u1 =    = un. Thus, a surplus-sharing ratio
exists that is common to all consumers, rc 2 [0; 1=n], such that ui = rcwg(fsg [ N) for
each i 2 N . In addition, we have us = (1  nrc)wg(fsg [N). If the supplier chooses g in
the rst stage, then his/her payo attained at the solution is
ETPS (g) 
(
(1  nrc)(nv(g)  c(g)) if nv(g)  c(g) > 0;
0 if nv(g)  c(g)  0:
18The formal analysis of Subsection 5.1 is available upon request.
19See Peleg and Sudholter (2007) for the denitions of those solutions.
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Given this supplier's payo function, it is supported at an equilibrium that the supplier
chooses g(n) in the rst stage because g(n) maximizes the total surplus nv(g)   c(g).
Therefore, under the solution satisfying the ETP, the supplier always provides the public
good eciently, which is dierent from the main result of this study. This dierence comes
from the ETP. Under the solution with the ETP, all consumers obtain the same payo,
which means they all transfer the same amount of money to the supplier. Thus, the
solution under the ETP is assumed implicitly to have a function that prevents consumers
from free riding.
However, in contradiction, it is hard to state that the solution with the ETP has the
function of preventing free riding. This is demonstrated by the following example. Let
g be such that (n   1)v(g) > c(g). Let i 2 N be a consumer who obtains the payo
uETPi  rc(nv(g)   c(g)) under the solution with the ETP. Since (n   1)v(g) > c(g),
then wg(fsg [Nnfig) > 0, which means that the coalition fsg [Nnfig produces g units
of the public good even if consumer i opts out from fsg [ N . Thus, since the public
good is pure, consumer i can enjoy the free-riding payo v(g) even if he/she opts out
of N . The free-riding payo v(g) clearly outperforms uETPi since rc  1=n and uETPi 
v(g)   (c(g)=n) < v(g). Thus, the solution with the ETP might be inappropriate for the
analysis of bargaining over pure public good provision.
5.2 Heterogeneous consumers
We prove that it is partially correct that the supplier produces the public good ine-
ciently if his/her bargaining power is suciently strong, even when consumers are hetero-
geneous.20
We consider the case in which there are two consumers (N = f1; 2g) and they have
dierent benet functions and bargaining power to the supplier. The payo to consumer
i 2 N is vi(g)   Ti, where vi : R+ ! R+ is consumer i's benet function from the public
good that satises vi(0) = 0, v
0
i > 0, v
00
i  0, and twice continuous dierentiability. Let
i 2 [0; 1] be the supplier's bargaining power with consumer i 2 N . The cost function
c(g) satises c(0) = 0, c0 > 0, c00 > 0, and twice continuous dierentiability. To make the
analysis simpler, our analysis is based on the assumption that vi(g) = ig for each i 2 N ,
where 0 < 1 < 2, c(g) = g
2=2, and 1  2. The timing of the game is the same as that
for the basic model.
We can derive equilibria in each stage, similarly to the case of identical consumers.
From the analysis, we obtain that consumers 1 and 2 are both pivotal to (g; T1; T2) if and
only if g satises
2

2   (1  2)1
2
1

 g < 2(1 + 2): (20)
It is true that if the ecient level of the public good, 1 + 2, is produced at an
equilibrium of the game, then both consumers 1 and 2 are pivotal to the ecient provision
(see Claim 1 in the Appendix). That is, by (20), if 1 + 2 is produced in equilibrium,
then
1 + 2  2

2   (1  2)1
2
1

or 2  221
2   1 + 221 : (21)
20See the Appendix for detailed derivation.
21
Therefore, if the supplier's bargaining power with consumer 2 is suciently strong in the
sense that 2 2 ((221)=(2   1 + 221); 1], then the supplier does not produce the
public good eciently in equilibrium.
Since 221=(2 1+221) is increasing in 1, the interval (221=(2 1+221); 1]
shrinks as 1 increases. However, since this interval is nonempty at any value of 1, the
implication is true for any 1.
In conclusion, in this extended model, the Pareto-ecient allocation is not achieved in
equilibrium if the supplier's bargaining power with some (notevery) consumer (consumer
2 in the above analysis) is suciently strong. In this sense, the main result in the case of
identical consumers remains partially true.
5.3 Commitment to the level of public goods before negotiation
In the basic model, the supplier is the decision maker of the level of the public good
and commits to a level before negotiating.21 In contrast to this, we now consider a new
simultaneous bilateral bargaining model in which the supplier and each consumer negotiate
the level of the public good as well as transfer. This model consists of two stages. In the
rst stage, the supplier and each consumer i 2 N bilaterally negotiate the joint production
level of the public good gi  0 and the transfer to the supplier from consumer i Ti( 0).
We assume that every bilateral negotiation is simultaneous and Nash bargaining, as in the
basic model. Hence, gi is negotiated so as to maximize the joint surplus of the bilateral
negotiation between the supplier and consumer i; Ti is determined so as to share the
maximized joint surplus in proportion to the bargaining power (the supplier's bargaining
power and consumer i's bargaining power is  and 1   , as in the basic model). Let
(gj ; Tj)j2N be the outcome of the simultaneous bilateral bargaining. In the second stage,
the supplier decides whether he/she executes (gj ; Tj)j2N . If so, then his/her payo isP
j2N Tj   c(
P
j2N gj). Otherwise, the payo is zero.
As in the basic model, the joint surplus of each bilateral negotiation takes dierent
forms, depending on whether each consumer is pivotal. Consumer i 2 N is said to be
pivotal to (gj ; Tj)j2N if
P
j2N Tj  c(gi+
P
j 6=i gj) and
P
j 6=i Tj < c(
P
j 6=i gj). If consumer
i is pivotal to the supplier's second-stage decision, then the joint surplus of the bilateral
bargaining session is v(gi +
P
j 6=i gj)   c(gi +
P
j 6=i gj) +
P
j 6=i Tj . If consumer i is not
pivotal, then the joint surplus of the bilateral bargaining session is v(gi +
P
j 6=i gj)  
v(
P
j 6=i gj)  [c(gi +
P
j 6=i gj)  c(
P
j 6=i gj)].
We can conrm that in this model, irrespective of whether consumer i is pivotal,
the joint surplus maximization of the supplier and consumer i is equivalent with the
maximization of v(gi +
P
j 6=i gj)   c(gi +
P
j 6=i gj) given (gj)j 6=i through the choice of gi.
That is, in each bilateral negotiation, the total surplus nv(g)   c(g) is never maximized,
which induces the inecient provision of the public good. Formally we can show that in
every equilibrium of this game, g(1) units of the public good are provided.
The implications of the analysis are as follows: (i) The ecient level of the public good
g(n) is never supported at any equilibrium in the new model (recall g(1) < g(n)). (ii) The
commitment to the level of the public good before negotiation, like in the rst stage in
the basic model, is necessary to achieve the ecient allocation.
21The formal analysis in Subsection 5.3 is available upon request.
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5.4 Implications of results for political bargaining
We can t our basic model to the story of intergovernmental negotiation like the one
in Section 1. Suppose that in several regions there are citizens which have identical
preferences over consumption of private and public goods. In each region, one of the
citizens is elected as a governor, who participates in a negotiation and acts according to
his/her interests.2223 The central government determines the level of the public good.
It has no source of outside funding, and hence, the cost of the public good must be
compensated by beneciary regions: whether there is a budget surplus is essential for this
central government.24 If we interpret \consumers" in the basic model as these regional
governors and \supplier" as this central government, we can apply our model to the
intergovernmental negotiation.
We have not examined the case of n = 1. In this case, obviously, the supplier always
produces the public good eciently for any value of the supplier's bargaining power in
equilibrium. That is, the bilateral bargaining procedure itself works successfully when the
supplier negotiates with one consumer. This is very dierent from the result in the case of
n  2. The dierence between the cases of n  2 and n = 1 is the existence of externalities
between bilateral negotiations. Thus, we conclude that the externalities between bilateral
bargaining sessions cause the Pareto ineciency.
Lulfesmann (2002), Gradstein (2004), and Luelfesmann et al. (2015) study political
bargaining over the provision of interregional public goods. In their models, there are two
regions: one supplies a public good and another benets from the public good. There
is only one bilateral session in which the representatives of those two regions negotiate.
The bilateral bargaining is assumed to be resolved through the Nash bargaining solution.
However, the authors show that the allocation through the bargaining may be inecient
because of political factors, such as strategic delegation and majority decisions that neglect
the minority, which distort the bargaining outcome. In their models, the bargaining
procedure itself is not a source of the Pareto ineciency.
On the other hand, from our result, we could say that the bargaining procedure itself
becomes a source of the Pareto ineciency as well as the political factors if the models
of political bargaining in the earlier studies are extended to the case in which there are
\many" regions beneting from the public good. When the representative of the supplier
region and that of each beneciary region negotiate in a manner similar to our simultaneous
bilateral negotiation, the negotiation itself does not work eciently, as seen in the analysis
of the basic model. Not only the political factors but also the bargaining procedure matter
in the extended model.
22Since every resident in the regions is identical, we can provide another interpretation that local gov-
ernments of the regions act in the best interest of their representative constituencies. Luelfesmann et al.
(2015) provide a similar interpretation.
23We can observe an approach that the representatives of regions act in their best interests in may
studies (see, for example, Gradstein (2004)).
24See more discussions for the supplier's objective function in Section 6.
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6 Concluding remarks
We examine a supplier's decision about a public good in the face of bargaining with ben-
eciaries of the good. Our bargaining model is built on simultaneous bilateral bargaining.
Our results show that the supplier's bargaining power is a key factor for his/her decision.
We show that under some conditions, the supplier produces the public good eciently at
an equilibrium if and only if his/her bargaining power is suciently weak (Theorem 1).
This can be interpreted in the relationship between the eciency of the supplier's decision
and his/her willingness to accept a budget surplus; if a supplier is willing to accept a
suciently near balanced-budget outcome, he/she is more likely to achieve the ecient
provision of the public good. A supplier with strong bargaining power who obtains a large
surplus provides the public good ineciently. In some case, this ineciency stems from
the excessive provision of the public good (Subsection 4.2). In addition, we investigate
the likelihood of the ecient public good provision in equilibrium. Under the reasonable
parametric benet and cost functions, the equilibrium likelihood of the ecient provision
of the public good diminishes as the number of consumers increases. However, in some
case, the equilibrium likelihood is suciently high even if the number of consumers is very
large (Subsection 4.1). This implies that there may be a suciently weak supplier who
eciently produces the public good even if he/she negotiates with \many" consumers.
We assume that the supplier is a budget-surplus (or prot) maximizer. However,
the supplier's objective may dier depending on the situation. If we consider public
good provision by the central government, then it might be reasonable to consider that
the level of the public good and the cost distribution are determined by the national
legislature. Then, the central government's objective is the maximization of the welfare
of the majority of the legislature. The maximization of social welfare could be another
objective of the central government.25 However, we consider that maximization of budget
surplus can be an objective of the government if the decision for the public good is based
on a bureaucratic system and bureaucrats maximize their prots, like the approach of
public choice theory. Moreover, the model of prot-maximizing governments has been
studied by several researchers, such as Mansoorian and Myers (1997). In some studies on
mechanism design for public good provision, the central authority is assumed to be a prot
maximizer (see, e.g., Guth and Hellwig, 1986; Lu and Quah, 2009). Finally, whether there
is a budget surplus seems essential to public projects when there is no source of outside
funding. In this case, it may not be problematic that the government takes account of the
budget surplus.
25In our bargaining model, the supplier takes the contributors' joint surplus into account and the supplier
receives contributions from all consumers in equilibrium. Hence, the supplier considers the total surplus
to some extent (see the numerator on the right-hand side of (3)).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
We prove only (13) ((14) can be proven similarly). Dierentiating (g(m);m) with respect
to m yields
@(g(m);m)
@m
=
1
m  1 
c0(g(m))v(g(m))  c(g(m))v0(g(m))
(v(g(m)))2

d g(m)
dm
  (v(g(m)))
2
c0(g(m))v(g(m))  c(g(m))v0(g(m)) 
c(g(m))
v(g(m))(m  1)| {z }
(22:1)

: (22)
We rst observe that c0(g(m))v(g(m))   c(g(m))v0(g(m)) > 0 by (1.2) of Assumption 1.
Second, we observe that G((m  1)) is the inverse function of c(g)=v(g) and
@G((m  1))
@m
=
dG((m  1))
d(m  1)   =
(v(g))2
c0(g)v(g)  c(g)v0(g)  :
Since G ((g(m);m)(m  1)) = g(m) and (22.1) is equal to (g(m);m), then
@G((m  1))
@m

(m 1)=(g(m);m)(m 1)
=
(v(g(m)))2
c0(g(m))v(g(m))  c(g(m))v0(g(m)) 
c(g(m))
v(g(m))(m  1) :
We obtain (13) from (22). 
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that 0    minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m). If  = 0, the supplier's payo is zero,
irrespective of his/her choice of g. Thus, g(n) is one of the optimal levels for the supplier.
Hereafter, we restrict our focus to the case in which 0 <   minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m).
Note that this condition and (16) imply
gm  g(m) for each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng:
We obtain the following three subcases in order to examine the relationship between
gm+1 and g(m) for each m:
 Subcase 1.1: minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1)    maxm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1).
 Subcase 1.2:  < minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1).
 Subcase 1.3: maxm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1) < minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m)
and maxm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1) <   minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m).
Typical situations in the three cases are summarized in Figure 3. Subcases 1.1, 1.2, and
1.3 correspond to the case of  = 11, that of  = 12, and that of  = 13, respectively.
Since we do not impose any restriction except nonincreasing (g(m);m + 1), we must
consider various possibilities. In some cases, as in the case of suciently small , like
25
 = 12 (Subcase 1.2) or the case of suciently high , like  = 13 (Subcase 1.3),  may
not intersect with (g(m);m + 1) at any m 2 [1; n]. In the other case,  may intersect
with (g(m);m+ 1), not only at the unique m 2 [1; n], but also at multiple points, as in
the case of  = 11 (Subcase 1.1).
hInsert Figure 3 herei
(Subcase 1.1) In this subcase, at least one m 2 [1; n] exists such that  = (g(m);m+
1). Denote the largest one among such ms by m00 2 [1; n] (like in Figure 3). In addition,
let m+ 1() be the greatest integer that is less than or equal to m00. Then, by (15), for
each m 2 f1; : : : ;m+ 1()g, gm+1  g(m); by (16), for each m 2 fm+ 1() + 1; : : : ; ng,
gm  g(m) < gm+1.26
First, consider the category f1; : : : ;m+ 1()g. The supplier receives transfers from
the consumers of the number in this category if and only if the supplier chooses g 2
(0; gm+1()+1). Let m 2 f1; : : : ;m+ 1()g. The supplier receives transfers from m
consumers if and only if g 2 [gm; gm+1). By (15), since m 2 f1; : : : ;m+ 1()g, then
gm+1  g(m). Thus, mS (g) is increasing in [gm; gm+1). Since mS (g) is continuous at every
g, we can dene mS (g
m+1) and
lim
g"gm+1
mS (g) = 
m
S (g
m+1) =

 
mv(gm+1)  c(gm+1)
 + (1  )m :
Thus, supg2[gm; gm+1) mS (g) = 
m
S (g
m+1).
For each  2 f1; : : : ;m+ 1()   1g, we obtain S(g+1) < +1S (g+1) by Lemma 3.
By (15), g+1 < g+2  g( + 1), which implies +1S (g+1) < +1S (g+2). Hence, for
each  2 f1; : : : ;m+ 1()  1g,
sup
g2[g; g+1)
S(g) = 

S(g
+1) < +1S (g
+2) = sup
g2[g+1; g+2)
+1S (g): (23)
From (23), we obtain
sup
m2f1;:::;m+1()g
 
sup
g2[gm; gm+1)
mS (g)
!
= 
m+1()
S (g
m+1()+1):
This means that the supremum of the supplier's payo in [0; gm+1()+1) is 
m+1()
S (g
m+1()+1).
Second, consider the category fm+ 1() + 1; : : : ; ng. The supplier receives transfers
from the consumers with the number in this category if and only if the supplier chooses
g 2 [gm+1()+1; gn). Let m 2 fm+ 1() + 1; : : : ; ng. By (16), gm  g(m) < gm+1. Then,
mS (g) is maximized at g = g(m). By Corollary 1, for each  2 fm+ 1() + 1; : : : ; n  1g,
S(g()) < 
+1
S (g(+ 1)):
Thus, the maximum of the supplier's payo in [gm+1()+1; gn) is nS(g(n)).
26If n < m+ 1()+1, then fm+ 1()+1; : : : ; ng is empty. Then, gm+1  g(m) for each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
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Finally, we show that in Subcase 1.1, the supplier's payo is maximized globally at
g = g(n). If n = m+ 1(), then gn < gn+1 = g(n) < gn by (15).27 Hence, the supplier
can choose g(n), receiving transfers from n consumers. By (23),
0 < 1S(g
2) <    < n 1S (gn) < nS(gn+1) = nS(g(n)):
Hence, g(n) maximizes the supplier's prot. If m+ 1() < n, then
0 < 1S(g
2) <    < m+1()S (gm+1()+1)
< 
m+1()+1
S (g
m+1()+1)  m+1()+1S (g(m+ 1() + 1)) (24)
     nS(g(n)): (25)
The rst inequality in (24) comes from Lemma 3 and the second from gm+1()+1 
g(m+ 1() + 1).28 Hence, g(n) maximizes the supplier's payo.
(Subcase 1.2) In this subcase, we obtain gm < gm+1 < g(m) for each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng
by (15). The analysis of this subcase is almost the same as that of Subcase 1.1 with
n = m+ 1(). Similarly to the above analysis, we obtain that for each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng,
mS (g) increases as g moves from g
m to gm+1. As in (23), we obtain that for each m 2
f1; : : : ; n  1g,
lim
g"gm+1
mS (g) < lim
g"gm+2
m+1S (g):
Since gn+1 < g(n), we nally obtain
0 < 1S(g
2) <    < n 1S (gn) < nS(gn+1) < nS(g(n)):
Thus, the supplier chooses g(n) at the rst stage.
(Subcase 1.3) In this subcase, we obtain that gm  g(m) < gm+1 for each m 2
f1; : : : ; ng by (16). For each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng, mS (g) is maximized at g = g(m). By
Corollary 1, mS (g(m)) < 
n
S(g(n)) for each m 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g. Thus, the supplier chooses
g(n) at the rst stage.
In conclusion, in any subcase, the supplier chooses g(n) in equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2
To the contrary, suppose that  > minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m) (=  (g(n); n)) and an equi-
librium exists at which the supplier produces the public good eciently. Suppose that on
the path of this equilibrium, the supplier chooses g(n) in the rst stage, he/she receives
transfers from  2 f1; : : : ; ng consumers in the second stage, and he/she executes the
project in the third stage. The supplier obtains S(g(n)) in this equilibrium.
27Note that n = m+ 1() if and only ifm00 = n. Ifm00 = n, then (g(n); n+1) = . Hence, gn+1 = g(n).
28If m+ 1()+1 = n, the last inequality in (24) becomes nS(g
n)  nS(g(n)). If m+ 1()+1 < n, then
all inequalities in (25) hold strictly by Corollary 1.
27
Note that the supplier chooses a level of the public good in the set [g; g] when the
supplier receives positive transfers from  consumers. Since the supplier chooses g(n) given
that he/she receives positive transfers from  consumers, g(n) must belong to [g; g]. By
(17), we obtain g(n) < gn from  > (g(n); n). Thus, in this equilibrium, the supplier
never receives positive transfers from n consumers:  < n.
We need to consider two possibilities: g < g(n) and g = g(n). Suppose rst that
g < g(n). We obtain g() < g(n) since  < n. Since S(g) is decreasing in g if
g > g(), then, if the supplier sets a level of the public good a bit lower than g(n) in
the interval [g; g], the supplier's payo increases (the supplier can choose such a level
because of g < g(n)). Second, suppose that g = g(n). By Condition 2 and  < n,
S(g
) = S(g(n)) < 
n
S(g
n). In any case, the supplier does not choose g(n) in the
equilibrium, which is a contradiction. 
Remark 1 Proof of Proposition 2 does not depend on the equilibrium selection in the
second and third stages presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.2. In addition to the equilibrium
presented in Section 3.1, in the third stage, there is an equilibrium at which the supplier
chooses execution if and only if
P
j2N Tj  c(g). Depending on which third-stage equi-
librium we consider, the condition under which  consumers transfer to the supplier is
g(n) 2 [g; g) or g(n) 2 (g; g]; that is, in any equilibrium, if  consumers transfer to
the supplier, then g(n) 2 [g; g]. In the proof, we consider this interval.
Analysis in Subsection 4.2
Suppose that the second and third-stage equilibria are the same as those in Sections 3.1 and
3.2.2. We now prove that the supplier's payo is maximized when he/she chooses gn. Since
n = 11 and  > minm2f1;:::;ng (g(m);m), we obtain  > 0:55. Since (g(m);m+1) = 1=2
and  > 0:55, it follows that g(m) < gm+1 for each m (see Lemma 6). We obtain that
(g(m);m) =  at m  2=(2   1). Let ~m  2=(2   1). Then, gm  g(m) if m  ~m
and g(m)  gm if m  ~m (see Lemma 6). In summary, gm  g(m) < gm+1 if m  ~m and
g(m)  gm < gm+1 if m  ~m.
We also obtain
mS (g(m)) =
m2
4(1 + (1  )(m  1)) and 
m
S (g
m) = 2(m  1):
Note that mS (g(m)) and 
m
S (g
m) are increasing in m.
Since mS (g(m)) is increasing in m, we obtain 
m
S (g(m)) < 
~m
S (g( ~m)) for each m < ~m.
By (7.b) of Lemma 7, in [0; g ~m), the supplier's payo is maximized at g = g( ~m) and the
maximized payo is
 ~mS (g( ~m)) =
2
2   1 :
Since mS (g
m) is increasing in m, we obtain mS (g
m) < 11S (g
11) for each m 2 [ ~m; 11). By
(7.c) of Lemma 7, in [g ~m;1), it is maximized at g = g11 and the maximized payo is
11S (g
11) = 102. The dierence between those payos is
11S (g
11)   ~m(g( ~m)) = 
2(20   11)
2   1 > 0 since  > 0:55:
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Since mS (g(m)) is increasing in m, we also obtain 
11
S (g
11) mS (g(m)) > 0 for all inte-
gers m such that m  ~m. Therefore, in this numerical example, the supplier oversupplies
the public good when his/her bargaining power is suciently high.
Analysis in Subsection 5.2
The analysis is based on the assumption that v1(g) < v2(g) for all g > 0 and 1  2.
Under this assumption, for any level of the public good, consumer 2's benet from the
public good is greater than consumer 1's; the supplier's bargaining power with consumer
2 is not lower than that with consumer 1.
The analysis of the third stage is the same as that of the case of identical consumers.
Based on the third-stage equilibrium, consumer i 2 N is said to be pivotal to a project
(g; Ti; Tj) (i 6= j) if Ti + Tj > c(g)  Tj .
In the second stage, if consumer i is nonpivotal to (g; Ti; Tj), then Ti = 0. If consumer
i is pivotal, then
Ti = vi(g)  (1  i)(vi(g) + Tj   c(g)) = ivi(g)  (1  i)(Tj   c(g)): (26)
If consumer i is pivotal and consumer j is not, then Ti = ivi(g)+(1 i)c(g) and Tj =
0. The supplier's payo is 
fig
S (g)  i(vi(g) c(g)) (The upper-script letter figmeans that
the supplier receives transfers from consumer i). Consumer i's payo is (1 i)(vi(g) c(g))
and consumer j's payo is vj(g).
If consumers 1 and 2 are pivotal, then (26) is satised for each i 2 N ; hence,
Ti =
ivi(g)  (1  i)j(vj(g)  c(g))
i + j   ij ; (27)
where j 2 Nnfig.29 The supplier's payo is
NS (g)  T1 + T2   c(g) =
12
1 + 2   12 (v1(g) + v2(g)  c(g))
(The upper-script letter N means that the supplier receives transfers from consumers 1
and 2).
Consumer i is pivotal to (g; T1; T2) if and only if Ti + Tj > c(g)  Tj (j 2 Nnfig). By
(27), Ti + Tj > c(g) if and only if vi(g) + vj(g) > c(g). By (27), c(g)  Tj if and only if
0  1
i + j   ij (j(vj(g)  c(g))  (1  j)ivi(g))
if and only if
vj(g)  (1  j)i
j
vi(g)  c(g):
Therefore, consumer i is pivotal to (g; T1; T2) if and only if g satises
vj(g)  (1  j)i
j
vi(g)  c(g) < vi(g) + vj(g) (j 2 Nnfig): (28)
29We assume in the subsequent analysis that Ti > 0 for each i 2 N when both consumers are pivotal.
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Since v1(g) < v2(g) for each g > 0 and 1  2,
v1(g)  (1  1)2
1
v2(g) < v2(g)  (1  2)1
2
v1(g):
Thus, by (28), consumers 1 and 2 are pivotal to (g; T1; T2) if and only if g satises
v2(g)  (1  2)1
2
v1(g)  c(g) < v1(g) + v2(g): (29)
Clearly, (29) does not hold at g = 0.
To simplify the discussion on (29), we further assume that for each i 2 N , vi(g) = ig,
where 0 < 1 < 2, and c(g) = g
2=2. Under those functions, consumers 1 and 2 are pivotal
if and only if g satises
2

2   (1  2)1
2
1

 g < 2(1 + 2): (30)
Let g(N)  argmaxg0
P
j2N vj(g)  c(g) and g(fig)  argmaxg0 vi(g)  c(g) for each
i 2 N . Then, g(N) = 1 + 2 and g(fig) = i for each i 2 N . Note that whether
g(N) = 1 + 2 satises (30) depends on the values of i and i (i 2 N).
In Claim 1, we show that the ecient provision of the public good is achieved at
an equilibrium of the game only if consumers 1 and 2 are both pivotal to the ecient
provision.
Claim 1 There is an equilibrium of the game that supports the provision of g(N) units
of the public good only if
g(N)  2

2   (1  2)1
2
1

: (31)
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that (31) does not hold, but an equilibrium exists at
which g(N) units of the public good are provided.
Since (31) does not hold, it is impossible that both consumers 1 and 2 are pivotal to
the provision of g(N) units of the public good. Hence, one of the consumers is pivotal to
the provision. For each g > 0, if consumer 1 is solely pivotal to the provision of g units
of the public good, then 0 < g  21.30 This, together with 21 < g(N), implies that
consumer 1 cannot be solely pivotal to the provision of g(N) units of the public good.
Therefore, if the supplier chooses g(N) in the rst stage, then consumer 2 is solely pivotal
to the provision of it.
Take ~g such that maxf21; 2g < ~g < g(N). Note that at ~g, consumer 1 cannot be
solely pivotal since 21 < ~g and consumer 2 can be pivotal since ~g < 22. The supplier's
payo when he/she chooses ~g is 
f2g
S (~g) = 2(v2(~g) c(~g)) and his/her payo when he/she
chooses g(N) is 
f2g
S (g(N)) = 2(v2(1 + 2)   c(1 + 2)). Since 2 < ~g < g(N) and
v2(g)   c(g) is maximized at g = g(f2g) = 2, we obtain f2gS (g(N)) < f2gS (~g), which
contradicts that g(N) units of the public good are provided in equilibrium. 
3021 is the maximal level of the public good that guarantees v1(g)  c(g)  0.
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Figure 1: Sharing the construction cost of a dam
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Figure 2: The case when m0 and m00 exist for 0 > 0
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Figure 3: Suciency
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Online Appendix for
\The eciency of monopolistic provision of public goods
through simultaneous bilateral bargaining"
Noriaki Matsushima and Ryusuke Shinohara
A.1 Equilibrium level of the public good when  is suciently high
We focus on the analysis of the rst stage, given the second- and third-stage equilibrium
in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2.2.
Assume Conditions 1 and 2. Suppose that  > minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m). By Lemma
5, (g(m);m) approaches innity as m decreases to one. Hence, for each  2 [0; 1], if
 > minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m), there is  2 (1; n] such that  =  (g(); ). However, we
cannot generally say whether  intersects with (g(m);m+1). Hence, we need to consider
the following two subcases.
 Subcase 2.1: minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m) <   maxm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1) and
minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m) < maxm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1).
 Subcase 2.2:  > minm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m) and  > maxm2f1;:::;ng  (g(m);m+ 1).
Typical situations in these two subcases are summarized in Figure 4. Subcases 2.1 and 2.2
correspond to the cases of  = 21 and  = 22, respectively. Since we do not impose any
restriction except nonincreasing (g(m);m) and (g(m);m+1), we must consider various
possibilities. In some cases, as in the case of  = 22 in this gure,  intersects with
(g(m);m) at some m 2 (1; n], but not with (g(m);m + 1) at any m 2 [1; n] (Subcase
2.2). In other cases, as in the case of  = 21 in this gure,  intersects with (g(m);m)
and (g(m);m+ 1) at some points (Subcase 2.1).
m

0
22
(g(m);m)
(g(m);m+ 1)
m01
21
nm00 m000
Figure 4: The case in which  is suciently high
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(Subcase 2.1) In this subcase, at least onem000 2 (1; n] exists such that  = (g(m000);m000)
and at least one m0 2 [1; n] exists such that  = (g(m0);m0+1) (see m0 and m000 in Figure
4). Such m0 and m000 are not necessarily unique. Let m0 be the maximal among such m0s
and let m000 be the maximal among such m000s. Let m() 2 f1; : : : ; ng be the maximal inte-
ger that is less than or equal to m000 and let m+ 1() 2 f1; : : : ; ng be the maximal integer
that is less than or equal to m0. Clearly, m+ 1()  m().31 We set three categories for
the number of contributors:
Category I  m 2 f1; : : : ; ng : m  m+ 1()	.
Category II  m 2 f1; : : : ; ng : m+ 1() < m  m()	.
Category III  fm 2 f1; : : : ; ng : m() < mg.
As Claim A1 shows, while Categories I and III are nonempty, Category II may be
empty.
Claim A1 In Subcase 2.1, Categories I and III are nonempty. Category II is empty if
and only if m+ 1() = m().
Proof. Category I is nonempty since 1  m0 implies 1  m+ 1(). The statement for
Category II is trivial. Category III is nonempty since m000 < n implies m() < n. 
By (15){(17), for each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng,
gm+1  g(m) if m 2 Category I
gm  g(m) < gm+1 if m 2 Category II
g(m) < gm if m 2 Category III:
(32)
We rst examine what is the best choice for the supplier within each category.
Category I. The supplier receives transfers from the number of consumers in this
category if and only if he/she chooses the level of the public good in (0; gm+1()+1). The
analysis for Category I is similar to that for Subcase 1.1 in the proof of Proposition 1. By
(32), for each m in Category I, gm+1  g(m); hence, for each m in this category, mS (g) is
increasing in the interval [gm; gm+1). The supplier receives transfers from m contributors
if and only if he/she chooses the level in the interval

gm; gm+1

. By the continuity of
mS (g) at every g, we can dene 
m
S (g
m+1) and
lim
g"gm+1
mS (g) = 
m
S (g
m+1) =

 
mv(gm+1)  c(gm+1)
1 + (1  )(m  1) :
Thus, we obtain supg2[gm; gm+1) mS (g) = limg"gm+1 
m
S (g). Similarly to (23), we obtain
that for each pair m, m+ 1 in Category I,
lim
g"gm+1
mS (g) < lim
g"gm+2
m+1S (g): (33)
By (33), the supremum of the supplier's payo in [0; gm+1()+1) is 
m+1()
S (g
m+1()+1).
31We obtain m0 < m000. However, there may be a case in which m+ 1() = m().
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Category II. The supplier receives transfers from the number of consumers in this
category if and only if he/she chooses the level in [gm+1()+1; gm()+1). The analysis for
this category is similar to that for Subcase 1.2 in the proof of Proposition 1. By (32),
for each m in Category II, g(m) 2 gm; gm+1; hence, for each m in this category, g(m)
maximizes mS (g) subject to g 2

gm; gm+1

. By Corollary 1, for each pair m, m + 1 in
Category II,
mS (g(m)) < 
m+1
S (g(m+ 1))
In conclusion, the maximum payo to the supplier in [gm+1()+1; gm()+1) is 
m()
S (g(m()))
within this category.
Category III. The supplier receives transfers from the number of consumers in this
category if and only if he/she chooses the level of the public good in [gm()+1; gn). By
(32), for each m in Category III, g(m) < gm; hence, for each m in this category, gm
maximizes mS (g) subject to g 2

gm; gm+1

and the supplier receives the payo mS
 
gm

.
By Condition 2, the maximal payo to the supplier in [gm()+1; gn) is nS
 
gn

.
Second, we examine what the best choice is for the supplier across the categories.
Claim A2 In equilibrium, the supplier never chooses g 2 [0; gm+1()+1).
Proof. We obtain
lim
g"gm+1()+1

m+1()
S (g) = 
m+1()
S

gm+1()+1

< 
m+1()+1
S

gm+1()+1

(by Lemma 3): (34)
Since Category II may be empty and Category III is nonempty by Claim A1, m+ 1()+1
belongs to Category II if Category II is nonempty and belongs to Category III if Category
II is empty. In any case, if the supplier chooses gm+1()+1 and receives transfers from
m+ 1()+1 contributors, then he/she can obtain the payo 
m+1()+1
S (g
m+1()+1). Note
that 
m+1()
S (g
m+1()+1) is the supremum of the supplier's payo in Category I. Hence, in
equilibrium, the supplier never chooses g such that g < gm+1()+1. 
Claim A3 In equilibrium, the supplier chooses g (m ()) if 
m()
S (g (m ())) > 
n
S
 
gn

,
which implies that the supplier underprovides the public good since g (m()) < g(n).
The supplier chooses gn if 
m()
S (g(m())) < 
n
S
 
gn

, which implies that the supplier
overprovides the public good since g(n) < gn.
Proof. The supplier's choice of the level of the public good is immediate from the pre-
vious analysis. We obtain g(m()) < g(n) since minm2f1;:::;ng (g(m);m) <  implies
m() < n. We have g(n) < gn since n belongs to Category III. 
By Claims A2 and A3, in this subcase, the supplier never chooses g(n) in equilibrium.
iii
(Subcase 2.2) The analysis of this subcase is almost the same as that of Subcase 2.1
in which Category I is empty. In this subcase, at least one m00 2 (1; n] exists such that
 = (g(m00);m00) (see m00 of Figure 4). Let m00 be the maximal among such m00 s. Let
m() 2 f1; : : : ; ng be the maximal integer that is less than or equal to m00. We set two
categories for the number of contributors as follows
Category A := fm 2 f1; : : : ; ng : m  m()g.
Category B := fm 2 f1; : : : ; ng : m() < mg.
Note that both categories are nonempty because 1  m() < n.32 For eachm 2 f1; : : : ; ng,
gm  g(m) if m 2 Category A and g(m) < gm if m 2 Category B. In addition, note that
in this subcase, for each m 2 f1; : : : ; ng, g(m) < gm+1. In summary,
gm  g(m) < gm+1 if m 2 Category A
g(m) < gm (< gm+1) if m 2 Category B:
For each m 2 Category A, g(m) maximizes mS (g) subject to g 2 [gm; gm+1). For each
m 2 Category B, gm maximizes mS (g) subject to g 2 [gm; gm+1). As in Subcase 2.1, we
obtain Claim A4, which is similar to Claim A3, and the proof of Claim A4 is the same as
that of Claim A3.
Claim A4 In equilibrium, the supplier chooses g (m ()) if 
m()
S (g (m ())) > 
n
S
 
gn

,
which implies that the supplier underprovides the public good since g (m()) < g(n). The
supplier chooses g = gn if 
m()
S (g(m())) < 
n
S
 
gn

, which implies that the supplier
overprovides the public good since g(n) < gn.
By Claim A4, in this subcase, the supplier never chooses g(n) in equilibrium.
In conclusion, in any subcase, the supplier chooses an inecient level of the public
goods, that is, a level higher or lower than the ecient level.
A.2 Analysis without condition 1
We discuss whether the supplier provides the public good eciently if and only if his/her
bargaining power is suciently weak without Condition 1. We show that in a case in
which (g(m);m) and (g(m);m+1) are U-shaped, the supplier provides the public good
eciently if his/her bargaining power is suciently low; however, he/she may provide the
public good eciently even if his/her bargaining power is suciently high.
We focus on the analysis of the rst stage, given the second- and third-stage equilibrium
in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2.2. We consider a case in which (g(m);m) and (g(m)m+ 1)
are depicted in Figures 5 and 6. In this case, Condition 1 is not satised. Let  
minm2f1;:::;ng (g(m);m). Let 0 2 [0; 1] be the supplier's bargaining power. In Figure 5,
0   (in this sense, the supplier's bargaining power is suciently weak), while in Figure
6,  < 0 (in this sense, it is suciently strong).
32Since minm2f1;:::;ng (g(m);m) < , m() < n. Since (g(m);m) approaches innity as m approaches
1, 1  m().
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Figure 5: The case in which 0  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Figure 6: The case in which 0 > 
We rst consider the case in Figure 5, in which 0  . We categorize the number
of consumers as M51  fm 2 f1; : : : ; ng : m 2 (1;m1) or m > m2g and M52  fm 2
f1; : : : ; ng : m 2 [m1;m2) g: Then, by 0  ,
gm < gm+1  g(m) if m 2M51 and
gm  g(m) < gm+1 if m 2M52;
similarly to (15) and (16).33 By similar reason to (23),
mS (g
m+1) < S(g
+1) for each pair m;  2M51 such that m < : (35)
By Corollary 1,
m(g(m)) < (g())for each pair m;  2M52 such that m < .
We prove that in the case in Figure 5, the supplier's payo is maximized globally at
g = g(n). Suppose rst that n 2 M51. By (35), mS (gm+1) < nS(gn+1) for each m 2 M51
such that m 6= n. Since n 2M51 implies gn+1  g(n), nS(gn+1)  nS(g(n)). Thus, under
the constraint that g is the level of the public good at which the number of contributors
belongs toM51, the supplier's payo 
m
S (g) is maximized at m = n and g = g(n). For each
m 2 M52, by Corollary 1 and m < n, mS (g(m)) < nS(g(n)). Thus, there is no m 2 M52
such that mS (g(m)) > 
n
S(g(n)). In conclusion, if n 2 M51, then the supplier's payo is
maximized at g = g(n).
Suppose second that n 2 M52. This case is similar to Subcase 1.1 in the proof of
Proposition 1 because (g(m);m + 1) intersects 0 at once. Then, by analysis that is
similar to Subcase 1.1 in the proof of Proposition 1, we conrm that the supplier's payo
is maximized at g = g(n). In conclusion, in the case in Figure 5, the supplier's payo is
maximized at g = g(n).
Second, we consider the case in Figure 6, in which 0 > . In this case, the supplier
may or may not provide the public good good eciently. By (15), (16), and (17),
gm < gm+1 < g(m) if m 2 (1;m1) or m > m2;
gm  g(m)  gm+1 if m 2 [m1;m3] [ [m4;m2]; and
g(m) < gm < gm+1 if m 2 (m3;m4):
33Note that (15), (16), and (17) hold without Condition 1.
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Since 0 > , n > m3.34 Thus, we need to consider the following three cases: the case
with n 2 (m3;m4), the case with n 2 [m4;m2], and the case with n > m2. Suppose rst
that n 2 (m3;m4). Then, the analysis is the same as Section A.1 (note that we do not
have to consider the interval [m4;1)). In this case, the supplier never supplies the public
good eciently at any equilibrium.
Suppose second that n 2 [m4;m2]. Similarly to Claim A2, the equilibrium number of
consumers from which the supplier receives positive transfers does not belong to (1;m1).
By Corollary 1, nS(g(n)) > 
m
S (g(m)) for any other integer m 2 [m1;m3] [ [m4;m2]. Let
^ be the largest integer in (m3;m4). Then, by Condition 2, ^S(g
^) > mS (g
m) for any
other integer m 2 (m3;m4). In addition, we obtain
^S(g
^) < ^+1S (g
^)  ^+1S (g(^+ 1))
because the rst inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the second from ^+ 1 2 [m4;m2].
Moreover, we obtain
^+1S (g(^+ 1))  nS(g(n))
because ^ + 1  n. In conclusion, ^S(g^) < nS(g(n)). Therefore, the supplier chooses
g(n) in the rst stage.
Suppose nally that n > m2. Since n > m2, gn < gn+1 < g(n) and g(n) < gn.
The supplier prefers to receive transfers from n consumers to less than n and greater
than m2 consumers. In addition to the analysis for the second case, if we note that
mS (g(m)) < 
n
S(g(n)) for each integer m 2 [m4;m2], then we conrm that the supplier
chooses g(n) in the rst stage.
In conclusion, in the case in Figure 6, the supplier with suciently high bargaining
power provides the public good ineciently if and only if n 2 (m3;m4); the supplier may
provide the public good eciently if his/her bargaining power is suciently strong.
A.3 Analysis in Subsection 5.1
Simultaneous bilateral bargaining and the core
We show that the payos attained with simultaneous bilateral bargaining belong to the
core of some appropriate cooperative game.
Let N = fsg [N , where s is the supplier and N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of consumers
with n  2. For each g > 0 such that nv(g) > c(g), dene the characteristic function wg :
2N ! R+ as follows: for any nonempty subset C  N , wg(f;g) = wg(fsg) = wg(C) = 0;
wg(fsg[C) = maxfjCjv(g)  c(g); 0g.35 By this denition, the cooperation of the supplier
and consumers is necessary for a positive surplus. If C is suciently large, jCjv(g) > c(g)
holds; hence, the supplier provides g (decided in the rst stage) and the consumers in
C pay the fee to the supplier.The supplier is assumed to commit the level of the public
good decided in the rst stage. In the negotiation in coalitions, only the surplus division is
considered. A payo prole u = (ui)i2N belongs to the core of (N ; wg) if
P
i2C ui  wg(C)
for each C  N and Pi2N ui = wg(N ).
34Suppose that  < 0 and n  m3. Then, by Figure 6,  = (g(n); n)  0, which contradicts 0 > .
35jCj represents the cardinality of C.
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Let  2 [0; 1] be the supplier's bargaining power. Let g > 0 be a level of the public
good such that nv(g)   c(g) > 0. Let m be a number of pivotal consumers. Note then
that mv(g) > c(g) holds by the pivotal condition. Let M  N be a set of contributors.
Let us, uc, and uf denote the payos to the supplier, the contributor, and the free rider
through the simultaneous bilateral bargaining in the second stage, respectively. Then,
us = mS (g) =
(mv(g)  c(g))
 + (1  )m  0;
uc = v(g)  Tmi =
(1  )(mv(g)  c(g))
 + (1  )m  0; and
uf = v(g) > 0:
Proposition A1 A payo prole (ui)i2N such that us = us, ui = uc for any i 2M , and
ui = u
f for any i 2 NnM belongs to the core of (N ; wg).
Proof. Trivially,
P
i2C ui  wg(C) for each C  N such that wg(C) = 0. We need to
consider the coalition fsg[C such that C  N and wg(fsg[C) > 0; that is, jCjv(g) > c(g).
Let Cc  C be the set of contributors in C and let Cf  C be the set of free riders in C.
We obtain X
i2fsg[C
ui =
 + (1  )jCcj
 + (1  )m (mv(g)  c(g)) + jC
f jv(g):
Then, we obtain
 + (1  )jCcj
 + (1  )m (mv(g) c(g)) (jC
cjv(g) c(g)) = (m  jC
cj)
 + (1  )m (v(g) + (1  )c(g))  0:
Thus,
P
i2fsg[C ui  jCcjv(g)   c(g) + jCf jv(g) = wg(fsg [ C). In conclusion, (ui)i2N
belongs to the core of (N ; wg). 
Remark A1 We can prove that the core of (N ; wg) coincides with the set of payos
f(ui)i2N j ui  0 for each i 2 N and
P
i2N ui = nv(g)  c(g)g.
Simultaneous bargaining and the multilateral Nash bargaining solution
We clarify the relationship between the outcome through simultaneous bilateral bargaining
and the multilateral Nash bargaining solution. We suppose that the supplier and m
pivotal consumers come to the same negotiation table and multilaterally negotiate the
level of transfer. We analyze the outcome of this multilateral negotiation through the
multilateral Nash bargaining solution. That is, (Ti)i2M is determined so as to maximize
the Nash product (
P
i2M Ti c(g))
Q
i2M (v(g) Ti)1 . For each pivotal consumer i 2M ,
partially dierentiating the Nash product with respect to Ti yields
(v(g)  Ti) = (1  )
X
j2M
Tj   c(g)

or Ti = v(g) + (1  )c(g)  (1  )
X
j2Mnfig
Tj ;
which is equivalent to (1). Thus, the outcome of the multilateral Nash bargaining solution
is the same as that of the simultaneous bilateral bargaining through the Nash bargaining
solution.
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Sequential bilateral bargaining
We replace the second-stage bargaining of the basic model with the following sequential
bilateral bargaining model. The supplier rst negotiates with consumer 1, second nego-
tiates with consumer 2 after the bilateral bargaining with consumer 1, ..., and nally,
bilaterally negotiates with consumer n. The supplier has only one bilateral negotiation
with each consumer.
We focus on the third-stage equilibrium at which for each project (g; (Tj)j2N ), the
supplier executes the project if and only if
P
j2N Tj > c(g).
Given this third-stage equilibrium, we solve the second-stage sequential bargaining by
the backward application of the Nash bargaining solution. Given the outcome (g; (Tj)j 6=n),
the supplier negotiates with consumer n.
 IfPj2Nnfng Tj > c(g) or ifPj2Nnfng Tj  c(g) and v(g)  c(g) Pj2Nnfng Tj , then
the surplus of the bargaining session of the supplier and consumer n is zero; hence,
Tn = 0.
 IfPj2Nnfng Tj  c(g) and v(g) > c(g) Pj2Nnfng Tj , the surplus of this bargaining is
positive and consumer n pays to the supplier Tn = v(g) (1 )(v(g)+
P
j2Nnfng Tj 
c(g)) = v(g)  (1  )(Pj2Nnfng Tj   c(g)).
Given this outcome of the Nash bargaining solution, we next investigate bilateral bargain-
ing with consumer n  1.
We investigate the bilateral bargaining with consumer k 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g, assuming
that we have investigated the bilateral bargaining with consumer n to consumer k + 1
by the backward application of the Nash bargaining solution. Let (Tj)
n
j=k+1 be the Nash
bargaining outcome of the bargaining with consumers k + 1 to n. Before reaching the
bargaining with consumer k, the supplier negotiates with consumer 1 to k 1. Let (Tj)k 1j=1
be the outcome of the bargaining before the bargaining with consumer k. Given (Tj)
k 1
j=1 ,
the supplier and consumer k negotiate, anticipating that (Tj)
n
j=k+1 is obtained in the
subsequent negotiations.
 If Pk 1j=1 Tj + Pnj=k+1 Tj > c(g) or if Pk 1j=1 Tj + Pnj=k+1 Tj  c(g) and v(g) 
c(g)   (Pk 1j=1 Tj +Pnj=k+1 Tj), then the surplus of the bargaining session of the
supplier and consumer k is zero; hence, Tk = 0.
 IfPk 1j=1 Tj +Pnj=k+1 Tj  c(g) and v(g) > c(g) Pk 1j=1 Tj  Pnj=k+1 Tj , the surplus
of this bargaining is positive and consumer k pays to the supplier Tk = v(g)  (1 
)(v(g) +
P
j 6=k Tj   c(g)) = v(g)  (1  )(
P
j 6=k Tj   c(g)).
Given this Nash bargaining outcome, we return to the bilateral bargaining with con-
sumer k 1. Repeating a similar procedure until reaching the bargaining with consumer 1,
we nally obtain the following results. For each k 2 N , Tk = v(g) (1 )(
P
j 6=k Tj c(g))
if X
j2Nnfkg
Tj  c(g) and v(g) > c(g) 
X
j2Nnfkg
Tj (36)
viii
and Tk = 0 if
X
j2Nnfkg
Tj > c(g) or
24 X
j2Nnfkg
Tj  c(g) and v(g)  c(g) 
X
j2Nnfkg
Tj
35 : (37)
Claim A5 shows that (36) and (37) are equivalent to the pivotal condition and the
nonpivotal condition, respectively.36
Claim A5 (36) if and only if
P
j2Nnfkg Tj  c(g) <
P
j2N Tj .
Proof. ()) Obviously, Pj2Nnfkg Tj  c(g). Since Tk = v(g) + (1   )c(g)   (1  
)
P
j2Nnfkg Tj , we obtain
X
j2Nnfkg
Tj + Tj   c(g) = 
0@v(g) + X
j2Nnfkg
Tj   c(g)
1A > 0:
(() Obviously, Pj2Nnfkg Tj  c(g). Suppose that Pj2N Tj > c(g). Since Tk  v(g),
we obtain c(g) <
P
j2N Tj  v(g) +
P
j2Nnfkg Tj . 
By Claim A5, for each k 2 N , if (36), then k is pivotal to a project (g; (Tj)j2N ) and
Tk = v(g)   (1   )(
P
j 6=k Tj   c(g)); if (37), then k is nonpivotal and Tk = 0. This is
the same as the outcome of the simultaneous bilateral bargaining. Therefore, even under
the sequential bilateral negotiations, Theorem 1 still holds.
A.4 Analysis in Subsection 5.3
In the basic model, the supplier is the decision maker about the level of the public good and
commits to this level before negotiating. By contrast, we now consider a new simultaneous
bilateral bargaining model in which the supplier and each consumer negotiate the level
of the public good as well as the transfer. This model consists of two stages: rst, the
supplier and each consumer i 2 N bilaterally negotiate the joint production level of the
public good gi  0 and the transfer to the supplier from consumer i Ti  0. We assume,
as in the basic model, that each bilateral is Nash bargaining and simultaneous. Hence,
gi is negotiated so as to maximize the joint surplus of the bilateral negotiation between
the supplier and consumer i; Ti is determined so as to share the maximized joint surplus
in proportion to the bargaining power (the supplier's bargaining power and consumer i's
bargaining power are  and 1  , as in the basic model). Let (gj ; Tj)j2N be the outcome
of the simultaneous bilateral bargaining. In the second stage, the supplier decides whether
he/she executes (gj ; Tj)j2N . He/she provides
P
j2N gj and receives
P
j2N Tj if and only
if he/she executes.
Consumer i 2 N is said to be pivotal to (gj ; Tj)j2N if
P
j2N Tj  c(gi +
P
j 6=i gj) andP
j 6=i Tj < c(
P
j 6=i gj). As in the basic model, the joint surplus of each bilateral negotiation
36Note that the negation of (36) is equivalent to (37).
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takes dierent forms, depending on whether each consumer is pivotal. If consumer i is
pivotal, then the joint surplus of the bilateral negotiation is
v

gi +
X
j 6=i
gj

  c

gi +
X
j 6=i
gj

+
X
j 6=i
Tj :
If consumer i is not pivotal, then the joint surplus of the bilateral negotiation is
v

gi +
X
j 6=i
gj

  Ti   vi
X
j 6=i
gj

+
X
j2N
Tj   c

gi +
X
j 6=i
gj

 
24X
j 6=i
Tj   c
X
j 6=i
gj
35
= v

gi +
X
j 6=i
gj

  vi
X
j 6=i
gj

 
24cgi +X
j 6=i
gj

  c
X
j 6=i
gj
35 :
The supplier and consumer i maximize their surplus, anticipating the other bargaining
outcomes (gj ; Tj)j 6=i. Note that from the forms of the surplus, irrespective of whether
consumer i is pivotal, the bilateral negotiation maximizes v(gi+
P
j 6=i qj) c(gi+
P
j 6=i qj)
through the choice of gi. Hence, if we denote the levels of the public good supported at
an equilibrium by (gj )j2N , then
fgi g = argmax
gi0
v

gi +
X
j 6=i
gj

  c

gi +
X
j 6=i
gj

for each i 2 N:
We prove that g(1) units of the public good are provided at any equilibrium. Recall
that g(1) maximizes v(g)  c(g) and g(1) is an interior solution by Assumption 1. Then,
v0(g(1)) = c0(g(1)). To the contrary, suppose that for some g^ > g(1), equilibrium levels
of the public good (g^j)j2N exist such that
P
j2N g^j = g^. Since v
0(g(1)) = c0(g(1)) and
g(1) < g^, v0(g^) < c0(g^). Since g^i +
P
j 6=i g^j = g^ for each i 2 N , v0(g^i +
P
j 6=i g^j) <
c0(g^i +
P
j 6=i g^j) for each i 2 N . Since g^ > 0, at least one k 2 N exists such that g^k > 0.
Since v0(g^k +
P
j 6=k g^j) < c
0(g^k +
P
j 6=k g^j), the bargaining surplus between the supplier
and consumer k increases by decreasing the level of the public good a little from g^k, which
contradicts (g^j)j2N being supported at an equilibrium.
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